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THE LANTERN OF DIOGENES

HIS BEST FRIEND

¶ Somewhere in the vicinity which Ibsen chose for one of the liveliest scenes of *Peer Gynt*, we in our travels ran across the living model, or modern version of that delectable hypocrite.

¶ Like Peer his early education showed much neglect and was compensated by many tales of prowess and travel. He had sailed the seven seas, had seen everything worth seeing, and thought lightly of it all.

¶ Above all he boasted of no friendships except that of one luckless woman who had deeded him her property and ended with the explanation, "My dollar is my best friend."

¶ This struck us as a somewhat novel idea, for dollars to us have always seemed valuable for what they would procure and not for themselves. We probably are lacking in financial foresight, for there have always been a hundred things which dollars could not buy which seemed to us necessary to make life worth living.

¶ We wondered after all if we had boggled at life and if in a world where there seem to be so many dollars (in the hands of other people) we had made a sad mistake not to be a little more aggressive. Does not the Good Book somewhere tell us to "make friends of the mammon of unrighteousness" so that

when the winds of adversity blow "they may receive us into everlasting habitations?"

¶ Further consideration of these words seems to endow them with a Diogenesan irony. "Everlasting habitations!" What if in the life to come we could pursue only those occupations learned here, and had to spend eternity stacking dollars? The pitiful cases of Scrooge and Silas Marner arose in our minds!

¶ When a man chooses the dollar as his chief friend and confidant, this friend seems to demand whole-hearted devotion. So much so that he refuses to be spent sometimes when the man has real necessity. One knows people who find it painful to spend a dollar on their own enjoyment.

¶ Some spend their friends freely, using them until they wear them out, and showing a spend-thrift disposition that has no regard for the future, but not so if your best friend is your dollar. You would rather lose your eye-teeth than to lose him. You think some day you can or will spend him but the parting is too painful. It hurts you more than it does him.

¶ One must confess confusion until he thinks of the things that friend dollar could not give him which are yet desirable.

¶ For one thing, the dollar cannot give me health. Some of my most complaining friends have many dollars and little health. They have pursued health, from Florida to California, to the baths of Czechoslovakia and back again, at great expense and more labor and have not found it. This makes it seem rather foolish to pursue the dollar at the cost of health.

¶ We sit upon our terrace and watch the birds, those children of the air who sweep down out of the seeming nowhere into the here to bathe in the garden pool. Many of beautiful plumage and song rest here from the long pilgrimage of the sky to charm our

attention. They pay no heed to our dollars or lack of them but they show appreciation of our pool and larder. Our income from this source is very large.

¶ And the garden itself shows human traits in smiling back to the ministrations of Brown Bonnet with plethora of bloom till the droning bees and the darting humming-birds and flickering butterflies transform our lowly place to a thing of paradise.

¶ Inside, the wise and good of all times and climes, of all tribes and races, are in instant attendance and bear from the hearts of my books both instruction and delight. Even the capacity for such enjoyment as they give is in no remotest way dependent upon the dollar but upon my own effort.

¶ It would be impossible to catalogue such unpurchasable delights as the loyalty of old-time friends, whose devotion has reached across the years from childhood to the present hour, and have out-run the stress of time and circumstance, or the babble of baby voices in the dawn, or the smile of the one loved best of all, or the burdened steps of a toddler loaded down with a book from which he is about to demand "a story."

¶ If then we summarize, we find that the things most prized are in no sense purchasable on the market and our modern Peer Gynt was short-sighted. Did not the original Peer find at last his richest treasure in Solveig, whom he forgot but who would not forget him?

¶ Some will utter the reproach that these are but the loose ravings of an indigent philosopher, but Diogenes was also an indigent and his cynical candle still lightens a too morose and unhappy world.

R. T. F.

The Personalist

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF PHYSICAL REALITY

By LOUIS J. HOPKINS

THE substance of the inorganic world has been interpreted in two ways; one is known as the atomic theory, the other as the theory of continuity. According to Democritus, one of its earliest adherents, the atomic theory is based upon the fact that objects are irregular in shape and many of them changeable in form. Hence he claimed that it was reasonable to infer that the substance out of which these objects were formed must be made up of smaller units or particles which rearrange themselves with changing conditions. Democritus also claimed that when an object is moved, it must be moved into a space previously unoccupied, therefore he concluded that matter itself is not continuous. Anaxagoras, who was among the first to enunciate definitely a theory of continuity, claimed that what we believe to be an object in empty space is simply a concentration of a substance that is all-pervasive. The same principle, he believed, may be applied to the moving of an object in space as to that of a fish swimming in water; as the fish advances in one direction there is a replacement, and as it recedes, the existing fluid fills in behind it. In a measure all past and present theories as to the constitution of matter are suggested in these two hypotheses.

There was no marked progress in the interpretation of matter until Dalton at the beginning of the 19th century perfected his theory of the atom. In the theory of Dalton matter is assumed to be composed of minute particles absolutely indivisible and free from viscosity. It is further assumed that these particles are separated from each other by an absolute space. These minute particles have within

them the power both of attraction and repulsion. When the atoms are close enough together the repulsive force is operative, and when farther apart the attractive force becomes active. No explanation is suggested as to how these two forces act in and through absolute space.

The belief that the Dalton atom was the final element in the structure of matter was materially changed by a series of startling discoveries begun near the close of the 19th century. I refer to the discovery of the Cathode ray, the Lenard ray and the Röntgen ray. Following the discovery of these rays, Becquerel experimented with uranium. He found that it emitted a ray that would penetrate black paper, thus displaying a power not easily accounted for if it were made up of a combination of Dalton atoms. This led to further experiments in which the Curies and Bemont discovered an entirely new element, radium. As radium is relatively a million times more radio-active than uranium, the difficulties of fitting it into any accepted theory of matter became a necessity.

The new theory of matter suggested by Bohr and Rutherford abandoned the idea that the Dalton atom was an element, and, while still retaining this atom as a valuable concept in chemistry, held that it was a combination of protons and electrons. An electron is assumed to be the smallest possible charge of negative electricity, while the proton is the smallest positive charge. In this new theory, the solar system atom of Bohr and Rutherford is supposed to duplicate in an infinitely small way our solar system with its central sun and surrounding planets. The nucleus of the atom corresponding to the sun is either one proton, as in the hydrogen atom, or a number of protons and bound electrons as exemplified in the more complex atoms; while the planets which revolve around the central sun are duplicated by the

free electrons which revolve around the nucleus of the atom. In an almost infinitely small way there is the same relative spaces between the nucleus and the revolving electrons as there is between our sun and its planets.

The solar-system atom of Bohr and Rutherford while clearing up some of the inconsistencies of the Dalton atom, retained many of the conceptual difficulties which made the Dalton atom untenable. Just how one or a number of electrons revolving around a nucleus could produce light or any other form of radiant energy was difficult to imagine. Then too, we must remember that the Bohr model, beautiful as it might be, was unfortunately only a model and made up entirely of elements of which we have no knowledge for "Only when the atom radiates do we get anything observable, but of the radiation mechanism the Bohr theory says nothing."

There was another difficulty which Faraday had discovered, the difficulty of imagining a material universe composed of discrete atoms isolated in absolute space. Faraday was aware of the fact that electrically charged objects are accompanied by fields of electricity which surround them. This led him to the conclusion that the difficulty might be obviated by assuming that, whenever such action occurred, the object acted upon was within the electrical field of the object causing the action.

The field thus provided a conceptual apparatus which rendered unnecessary the idea of action at a distance. Faraday also had the bold idea that under appropriate circumstances fields might detach themselves from the bodies producing them and speed away through space as fields; this was his interpretation of light—Maxwell then discovered the wonderful group of formula which seems so simple to us nowadays and it finally built the bridge between the theory of electromagnetism and the theory of light. It appeared that light

consists of rapidly oscillating electro-magnetic fields.¹

If a rapid oscillation or a wave in an electro-magnetic field can produce the changes that both heat and light are capable of producing, then the question arises, why should we insist that there is anything more than waves as an explanation of the activities in the physical world? The question was not answered immediately because the belief in a substantial material world was still persistent. Sometime later, however, De Broglie concluded that the waves which accompany the electron might be used to form a better concept of the electron itself, and as it is possible for the waves to do the work of the electron, the idea of some ultimate particle surrounded by waves is not essential to the concept. This gives us a theory which makes the atom a diffused cloud of particles of electricity vibrating rapidly. The orbits of the revolving electrons suggested by Bohr and Rutherford are merely the average position of the vibrating electrons and an electron may be anywhere within the boundaries of the atom.

The concept of a wave atom has much to recommend it, but it does not eliminate all our difficulties. One of the problems that the wave theory leaves unsolved is found in the dual character of light. Light appears to have the characteristic of a bullet or corpuscle as well as that of a wave, and this would imply that the protons and electrons are similarly endowed. On this theory the protons and electrons appear to be foreign bodies imbedded in the electro-magnetic field. Of course, it can be assumed that the corpuscular aspect of the proton is only a more concentrated form of the wave, but this would not eliminate all our

¹ Albert Einstein, *New York Times*, March, 15, '29.

difficulties for there is a still more fundamental difficulty involved in our concept of the wave atom.

We started our quest in an endeavor to find the substance of the inorganic world and we have found that instead of a substantial reality made up of indestructible elements, we must think of units of electricity or of waves. But in the first instance we are not informed what electricity is and in the second we are not told what kind of a medium or substance it is that forms the wave. The atom may be nothing more than a "bottled" form of waves but the question naturally arises as to what sort of a medium it is that waves? One cannot form any idea of a wave without a something which constitutes the wave. It is at this point that the wave theory becomes extremely vague. At the present time it seems to be agreed that the waves are not waves in a material substance. The ether, if still retained as a concept, is merely space endowed with certain non-material properties. It has been suggested that the property of the waves can be best described as the "subject of the verb to undulate" and "that it acts as this subject very well." Jeans suggests that the waves may not be located in either space or time. On this basis the supposed substantial reality which we describe by the term matter appears to be little more than a mathematical formula or perhaps better still a conceptual picture of a group of events in our human experience.

Anyone who is conversant with the development in physics during the past century, must be aware of the tremendous revolution that has taken place in that science. He will realize that the hard impenetrable billiard-ball atoms which the physicists of the 19th century believed to be "foundation stones of the universe," have been gradually replaced by a conceptual construction which has none

of the essential characteristics of the 19th century atom. This revolution in thought has not been as rapid as is generally believed. The idea was latent in Faraday's suggestion of the electric field as a conceptual apparatus to obviate the difficulty of thinking of a force acting between the atoms in empty space. Somewhat the same idea must have been present in the mind of Clifford when he concluded that the traditional postulate of a material atom was wholly inconsistent with experience and suggested the broader postulate of mind stuff as more consistent with our experience of the physical world and at the same time more congruous with the whole field of human experience. It was, I think, the same difficulty of visualizing any sort of material atom that led Stallo in 1881 to the conclusion that physics had a conceptual rather than a perceptual background. Then coming down to the present time we find that Eddington¹ believes in the mind stuff of Clifford; Dr. Swann finds the electron has a temperamental character and Jeans says

The universe can be best pictured although still very imperfectly, as consisting of pure thought, the thought of what, for a wider word, we must describe as a mathematical thinker.²

Now it may be urged that the conversion of so many physicists to the theory that the inorganic world is mind or something akin to mind is, in itself, no guarantee that it is a desirable postulate. It will be suggested that the physicists in adopting the mind theory are again making an excursion into metaphysics, not unlike the one they made when they endowed the Dalton atom with immortality, and that the final result of the present venture may be equally unedifying. The two ventures are not parallel. The Dalton atom was never anything more than a convenient methodo-

¹ *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 276.

² *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 146.

logical assumption and as such it did valiant service. It should never have been credited with the character of immutability. In the present venture the physicists are assuming that mind, as a postulate, is not necessarily final but that as a postulate it works better than any other postulate they have tried. Having tried every other method of interpreting the inorganic world they now have turned to mind as the most satisfactory. It alone seems to point the way to a resolution of a greater number of difficulties than anything else. Then too the physicists must realize that the postulate of mind is more in keeping with the demands of both biology and psychology though, of course, this would have no weight in determining the choice.

There is also some evidence of an empirical character that supports the postulate of mind as the ultimate reality in the inorganic world. I refer, of course, to the uncertainty principle or the indeterminacy in the behavior of the electron. Practically all physicists now agree that the moving electron does not behave in a manner that can be predicted. Instead of going where it should according to mechanical principles it goes, within certain narrow limits, where it pleases. As this freedom is wholly contrary to all mechanical principles the reason for it must be found elsewhere. The best place to look for it is where it is most evident and that is in the living organism. We may call this freedom which we find in the behavior of the electron indeterminacy, uncertainty, or by any other name we please, but names do not explain it, they are merely other ways of trying to express activities which by common consent are free; free in the ways our minds construe freedom; not determined or predictable. Try to think of freedom as something independent of volition or mind and you will soon realize the impossibility. It may be agreed that the freedom of the

electron is very much circumscribed, but that is not material; the essential and all important thing is that, however significant it may be, it is identical in character and mode of expression with that found in mind and nowhere else.

The idea that the electron, in its behavior, exhibits a form of freedom, which, in principle, is exactly the same as the freedom experienced by conscious human beings, and that the reality in both instances should be interpreted as mind will seem strange to those who still cling to a belief in some sort of a material universe. I think, however, the strangeness of the idea will disappear when we get more accustomed to it. For centuries we have been thinking and talking of a substantial material universe, so much so, that now we are at a loss to find other terms which will adequately describe it. We must also bear in mind that there is a tendency in many fields of thought not only to turn away from the materialistic interpretation but also a disposition to accept some kind of psychical interpretation. Even J. B. S. Haldane who has always been inclined to accept the materialistic interpretation, now says: "I am inclined, however, to think that if we knew enough it might ultimately be as possible to give an account of matter in terms of mind as conversely."¹ It will not be a greater surprise to many of us if Mr. Haldane should within a few years decide that we already know enough to interpret matters in terms of mind, than it was to have him even suggest such a possibility at the present time.

Anyway it is interesting to note that many of our most eminent physicists in their search for a conceptual apparatus which will enable them to form a satisfactory mental

¹ *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 1, No. 1.

picture of the physical world, have turned so completely away from the solid and substantial world their 19th century predecessors taught us to believe in. Let us hope that in this new departure the physicists will be as successful in persuading the common sense world to believe in the conceptual character of matter as the earlier physicists were in persuading it to believe in the dead inert atoms which had no real existence outside the imaginations of their inventors.

When I say that the dead inert atoms of the 19th century physicist only had an imaginary existence, I do not in any way deny the existence of those experiences which convey to each of us the idea of the existence of something additional to our own consciousness and from which our various conceptual constructions to interpret that something have been built. Instead of denying the existence of these experiences, I am demanding that we return to them as the primary and elemental facts and that we then seek a conceptual construction that will supply us with a consistent mental picture showing not only how these experiences are related to each other but also how the whole group is related to the rest of our experiences.

It is evident that there is a growing tendency on the part of our physicists to seek a more philosophical interpretation of our common sense world. Having experimented with the materialistic and mechanistic hypothesis in almost every conceivable way they are now turning to the idea that all these attempted explanations were nothing more than conceptual constructions built up from experience, and that none of them gives us an adequate picture of the reality that appears to be additional to our own consciousness and which we assume to be the cause of all objective experience.

Two quotations from two well known theoretical physicists will illustrate what I have in mind. Einstein says that

Man tries to make for himself in the fashion that suits him best a simplified and intelligible picture of the world; he then tries to some extent to substitute this cosmos of his for the world of experience, and thus to overcome it.¹

Sir James Jeans, who frequently is not in complete agreement with Einstein's interpretations, tells us in his presidential address to the British Association that

Theoretical physics is no longer concerned to study the Newtonian universe which it once believed to exist in its own right in space and time. It merely sets before itself the modest task of reducing to law and order the impressions that the universe makes on our senses. It is not concerned with what lies beyond the gateway of knowledge, but with what enters through the gateway of knowledge. It is concerned with appearances rather than reality, so that its task resembles that of the cartographer or map maker rather than that of the geologist or mining engineer.

Later in the same address, referring to the fact that physics has many philosophical implications, he says

What remains is in any case very different from the full-blooded matter and the forbidding materialism of the Victorian scientist. His objective and material universe is proved to consist of little more than constructs of our minds. To this extent, then, modern physics has moved in the direction of philosophic idealism. Mind and matter, if not proved to be of similar nature, are at least found to be ingredients of one single system. There is no longer room for the kind of dualism which has haunted philosophy since the days of Descartes.

This brings us at once face to face with the fundamental difficulty which confronts every form of philosophical idealism. If the nature we

¹ *The World as I See It*, p. 20.

study consists so largely of our own mental constructs, why do our many minds construct one and the same nature? Why, in brief, do we all see the same sun, moon and stars?¹

The question at the end of the last quotation will be answered later. What we are interested in at the present moment is the practical agreement by both Einstein and Jeans that both the common sense world and the scientific world, it would be more accurate to say worlds, are essentially conceptually constructed and not the real worlds we have assumed them to be.

This change in the interpretation of our experience has some very interesting effects. Now, instead of thinking of the various mental pictures which men have made of the world in the past as wholly erroneous, we think of them as approximately the best conceptual constructions that could be made at the time they were made. Instead of thinking of the past constructions as purely imaginary and our present construction as final, we realize that each has its place in the hierarchy of constructed worlds. The flat world, the Newtonian world and the world of relativity are constructions and the last is no more the actual reality than the first. It may be a better construction and may approximate more closely to the real than the first, but it is not the final construction, and we must think of it as taking its place among the various worlds which have been constructed in the past and also those that will be constructed in the future.

That the physicist in the past should have failed to find a conceptual construction that was satisfactory is not surprising for it is not his purpose to deal with all of experience and he is, as a rule, little concerned with that part of experience that is not within his chosen field. On the other

¹ *Science*, Sept. 7, '34, p. 215.

hand it has always been the purpose of philosophy to deal with the whole field of experience, and for that reason we should expect philosophy to supply us with a better conceptual construction of our world of experience.

In saying that the physicist deals only with a part of experience I do not mean to suggest that he should not have or express opinions about the ultimate reality which lies behind, and is the source of the experiences he deals with. Having studied the activities of the mind in this restricted field more thoroughly and more intensely than anyone else, the physicist may be able to form opinions about the source of these experiences that are of value not only to himself but also to philosophy. This, however, does not mean that his opinions which cannot be verified, shall have the same weight as the verifiable conclusions he arrives at in his own restricted field of inquiry. In passing from the sequences of events in our experiences of what we refer to as the physical world to the source of these experiences, the physicist goes beyond physics and enters the realm of metaphysics where the methods of scientific verification are no longer available.

With the exception of a small number of philosophers who have accepted a mechanistic and materialistic universe because it seemed more consistent with science, philosophy has always believed that matter is not a form of reality in itself, but rather a concept or a symbol of reality. This belief, while well founded, has expressed itself in so many different and contradictory ways that it has made no appeal to the popular imagination, and we must always remember that any idea to be effective must in some way, either directly or indirectly, be convincing to the multitude.

As if distressed by the changing fortunes of this life,

philosophers have tried to picture our present experience as but a shadow of a more fundamental reality where the vicissitudes of this life would not be so disturbing. Instead of relying implicitly on experience which tells us of a changing world, philosophy has sought the source of all experience in an unchanging reality. This unchanging reality has been expressed in many ways. Zeno's "One", Plato's "Eternal Ideas", Spinoza's "Perfect Being" and Hegel's "Absolute Idea" are characteristic representations. It is not something we experience or something built up from experience. It is rather an effort to reconcile the conflicting elements in the conceptual constructions we have built out of our experience by introducing a larger unity, intuitively conceived for this express purpose.

These ideas of unchanging reality may have answered some human need at the time they were advanced even if they never were really conceivable in a legitimate sense. At any rate, they were advanced long before we had our present scientific knowledge of the evolutionary process and we now know that if there is anything in the universe that is changeless neither our experience nor our knowledge of evolution supplies us with the slightest hint of its existence.

At this point the question naturally arises as to whether or not we experience anything that is additional to our own minds? May it not be true that our own minds and the mind of our creator comprehend all of reality? It is, of course, true that we have no actual experience of anything additional to our own personality. But if we assume that that which appears to be "given" in our experience is not something additional to our own personality, we are logically driven to a solipsistic form of idealism. If the experiences which common-sense interprets as the external world

and which may, more correctly, be called a part of the "given" are not assumed to be additional to our own personality, then we have no reason for inferring the existence of other conscious personalities, for the two inferences are made from practically the same elements in our experience. Now, aside from the fact that such a conclusion has never appealed to mankind in general, there is the added reason that if we accept it we are not at once committed to solipsism which makes each of us nothing more than a wraith existing in an unknown realm. We cannot even be sure that we have a creator or that our existence is for any purpose, for the concept of a creator and the concept of a purpose both require inferences more difficult than the inference that other conscious beings exist.

I hope the reader will bear in mind that I have refrained from referring to the "given" in experience as something outside the mind. Outside has certain geometrical connotations which are not characteristic elements of experience itself, but rather conceptual constructions built up from them. On the other hand, when we say that the "given" in our experience is something additional to our own consciousness there is nothing in the statement that implies that the "given" is in any way different in character from mind itself. This, I think, is a valuable distinction. If we try to form a mental picture of the "given" as something different from and in no way akin to mind we at once set up a duality that will continue to vex us in any effort we may make to interpret both the self and the "given" as characteristic manifestations of the real. I hasten to add that in assuming that the "given" in experience is of the same character as mind I am not reverting to any form of absolute idealism. I am simply seeking a term which may be used as a common denominator for both the self and the

not self; one that is free from the dual characteristics of our usual conceptual construction of the "given".

Now, if that part of our experience which we refer to as the "given", is mind, or something akin to mind, why, it may be asked, has man gone so far astray in interpreting it as something different from, and independent of, both life and mind? In a way this question has already been answered. I have emphasized the fact that in his effort to find a comprehensive method of interpreting the "given" in experience man has built up a large number of supplemental concepts which have been of value in limited fields of investigation, and then, forgetting that these supplemental concepts were constructed for certain limited and specific purposes, has assumed that they were descriptions of a fundamental reality. There is nothing wrong with the method and use of supplemental concepts. The error creeps in when it is assumed that the concepts have a wider application than they were originally intended to have. Matter was a valuable concept in physics until recently, but when either the physicist or the philosopher assumed that it was not an interpretation of the "given" but a fundamental reality and that our experiences of the "given" were merely the effects upon our minds of changes in matter, the assumption became both false and pernicious.

What do we know about the "given"? Let us begin with the one thing that we are absolutely sure of and about which there can be no argument, namely, that we ourselves are conscious. We know that we have a variety of experiences which are related to each other; not as if they were units separated and detached from each other, but rather as if they were somehow intimately related and flowing together as in a common medium. Some of these experiences come

to us without any apparent effort on our part. In certain circumstances it is almost impossible to avoid having them. Hence it is quite natural to assume that their origin is not in our own consciousness but that they are "given" to consciousness by something that is additional to but not unlike the mind that receives them. Our knowledge—if it can be called knowledge—of other conscious human beings comes to us in the same way and in the same manner as our experiences of that something which appears to be additional to consciousness itself. But with the experiences we have of other conscious human beings we gain an added confirmation of that something which appears to be additional to the mind, for we find that these other conscious human beings appear to have many of the experiences we have and it is this intersubjective agreement about these experiences that gives us an added confirmation of our belief in that something that is additional to our own minds. Without this intersubjective agreement our world of experience would be made up of a variety of conflicting elements; instead of an orderly world we should have a world of disorder; each percipient mind would be living in a world of its own, and that world would be in no way related to the world of any other conscious mind. Instead of being the difficulty which Sir James Jeans assumes it to be, this intersubjective agreement, which we find in ourselves and other conscious human beings, is the one thing that makes life rational. Without it we would be working at cross purposes and progress would be impossible. Without it there could be no order or purpose in our human experience.

While this intersubjective agreement in regard to the objective side of experience supplies us with an added reason for believing that there is something additional to ourselves, it, at the same time, compels us to make some

sort of a postulate as to the character of this something. We must assume that it is capable of producing the experiences which are similar in ourselves and others and we cannot assume that it is something categorically different from mind, for, in that case, it would be impossible to understand how it could have any effect upon us or upon others. By assuming that it is mind or something akin to mind we do away with the inevitable dualism that appears when we assume that it belongs to an entirely different category.

Having for so long thought of the "given", especially that part of the given which we refer to as the inorganic world as mechanical, it is not surprising that we should find it difficult to think of it as mind. When, however, we try to realize how something wholly mechanical can have any relation to the mind, and find how impossible it is to do so we will find it less difficult to think of the "given" as mind.

I hope no one will assume that by postulating mind as the fundamental reality I am in any way implying that the order and sequence of our common-sense world is unreal or that the caprice of an individual mind can change the orderly procession of our experience. Such a conclusion would be the exact opposite of what I have in mind. By postulating mind as the reality it is not proposed to change the character or order of experience, but rather to give the character and order of experience a background of reality that will survive in any analysis we may make of its component elements. When we infer that there are other minds it is no stretch of imagination to assume that there is an effective relationship between these other minds and ourselves, and, having done this, we have only to assume that there is a form of mind which we interpret

as the "given" to make our common-sense world more real and more substantial than it would be if we were to use any other postulate. We are simply postulating mind or something akin to mind as the common denominator, the source of all our objective experiences.

But, how, it will be asked, can mind, or something of the same nature as mind, be the source of all the varied and conflicting aspects of our objective experiences? Actually that is no more difficult to think of than the reception of these experiences in our individual minds. It is no more difficult to think of some form of mind that is additional to our own consciousness being the source of the plurality of our objective experiences than to think of our own minds harboring these experiences. When we have different experiences we do not think the identity of our own minds is changed. On the contrary we know that in the course of individual development the mind experiences many changes, and we know equally well that these changes are in the same mind. "The one and the many," or "unity and diversity", are problems only when we assume that the conceptual constructions which the mind has built out of experience are real and actual instead of being merely our interpretation of the "given". If we turn to experience itself as the mind finds it we see that variety and identity are not different things set over against each other but rather that they are essential characteristics of developing mind.

Let no one imagine that in suggesting mind as the best postulate for that which is "given" in our human experience that I am trying to substitute mind for the old discarded "Absolutes" of philosophy. Any such inference would be the exact opposite of what I have intended. Mind

is used in a pragmatic sense as the best and most available postulate at this time. When one that is better is discovered it should be adopted without hesitation. But until a better postulate is discovered we are surely justified in using mind as the best that is available.

Here it may be asked why should we require any postulate as to the nature and character of the "given?" Or if we require a postulate why is mind any better than matter or energy or any of the mechanistic postulates science has habitually used? The answer to the first question is that if we admit that the "given" is something additional to our own minds, then our curiosity will never be satisfied until we discover some way of interpreting it. The answer to the second question is that all mechanistic postulates have been found wholly unsatisfactory and some better postulate is imperatively demanded. In addition to the foregoing, the consequences which follow from a belief in a mechanistic materialism are such that we should be suspicious of its validity. If one believes in a mechanistic universe, he must renounce all ideas of personal responsibility, for he, with all his hopes and aspirations, is merely an accident in the vast network of cause and effect; all feelings of responsibility and all hopes and desires are alike meaningless; what the individual thinks or feels or strives for can never change the inevitable march of events in the slightest degree. Now contrast the effect this belief will have upon one who accepts it with that which will follow from the belief that the universe itself is mind, or something akin to mind, and that the individual mind is an active agent in creating the world it lives in. In the first instance one must feel that any effort on his part to change or improve the world is utterly useless while in the second instance one must realize the responsibility of a free and

creative personality engaged in a great adventure, where every act is fraught with the utmost significance. Surely in facing the consequences of such a choice the decision cannot be difficult.

The conclusion that the physical world, as we think of it and as science has taught us to think of it, is only a conceptual construction which we have built up from our experiences of one aspect of the "given" that is additional to ourselves, will seem to some readers unacquainted with philosophy not only highly improbable but as actually bordering on the absurd. Having become reconciled to the immensity of the physical universe and the insignificance of man in virtue of what they have assumed to be the discoveries of modern science, they will quite naturally feel that the very foundations of knowledge are being undermined. If, however, they will think of how many of our interpretations of the physical world in the past have been proved to be erroneous, they will then, I think, not find the interpretation here suggested so difficult. No one, with the exception of Mr. Dowie and a few other equally benighted individuals, would now assert that the flat world, once universally accepted as a matter of direct perceptual experience, actually existed; nor would any of our modern physicists be rash enough to claim that the Dalton atom, the existence of which their predecessors dogmatically affirmed, had any actual existence. If we analyze these beliefs, we realize at once that they were merely conceptual constructions invented to interpret that aspect of our experience which appears to be "given" and which also appears to be additional to our own consciousness. Knowing this, why should we be positive about our present common-sense interpretation of the universe.

More than two thousand years ago Protagoras said, "Man is the measure of all things, of those which are, that they are, and of those which are not, that they are not." Ever since that time man has been trying to interpret the *things that are*. In other words, man has been trying to form a mental picture of that which is the source of our objective experience, and which has always suggested a reality not himself, but, unfortunately, he has habitually assumed that his mental picture was itself the reality. We should now abandon this fatal habit and seek an interpretation that will be more in harmony with the mind that makes it. We should remember that the mind is not only the measure of the *things that are* but also of the *things that are not*.

COSMIC URGE

By E. GUY TALBOTT

My friend, the force that you call "Cosmic Urge,"
Is but another name you give to God.
You see a tree emerging from a pod;
You note the restless sea's eternal surge;
You watch the stars, each circling round its sun;
You find the universe obeys fixed rules;
And yet in all your teaching, all your schools,
You have not found just how these things are done.

Your "Cosmic Urge" is God; by you unknown,
Because He is not something you can find
By any artifice of human mind;
You see Him with the eye of faith alone.
So do not think, with scalpel or with knife,
That you can find the secret source of life.

“IF THERE BE A GOD”

By THE EDITOR

IT is as unnecessary to defend God or the experience of God as it is to write an *apologia* for the sunrise. The God who calls for defence or attack is only a local deity. Local, in the sense that he is only the God of opinion, of childish misconception, of provincial interests, of hateful caricature. The easiest way to win a debate is to caricature your opponent's position, since it demands no argument. For this reason opponents of the concept of God have chosen to destroy a straw Deity and the unequal contest has scarcely ever arisen to the level of intellectuality and seriousness. Atheistic journals and writers still spread the old matter of the Eighteenth Century and disclose the lucubrations of Paine and Voltaire as if they were fresh and rare. On both sides there has been much vilification and impugning of motives and little or no study of the meaning and implications either of theism, deism, agnosticism or atheism. Voltaire, whose attacks were directed at a tyrannical ecclesiasticism and not at all against the belief in God, though frequently quoted and misquoted by his devotees, was not so blind as they. He declared that if there were no God we should have to make one. This is the point most often overlooked by the derogators of the God idea. Even as a fiction, God would be as necessary to the social equation as the fiction of infinity in mathematics is necessary to the solution of mathematical problems. It is the practical or pragmatic basis for the belief in God that we propose here to consider. There are many other facets to the question, all of which are true ways of looking at the concept, but here we shall contemplate one which seems commonly neglected.

I.

The God of Caricature

As has already been indicated, the God of debate has been always a caricature. Nor has this been always or chiefly the fault of the enemies of religious belief. It must be confessed that the blindest and most devoted believers have frequently supplied them with caricature enough to make a rational defence of Deity appear impossible. But the God of caricature is one that few now fear, many ridicule and none worship.

The most distressing fact about the situation is that intelligent unbelievers should still be content to deal with a discredited concept of God which is held by few in order to win an easy victory. Such a course recommends neither their profundity of thought nor their intelligence. There doubtless are people who hold to an anthropomorphic God who is but the reflection of their human desires and prejudices, just as a certain period of childhood loves to cling to the belief in Santa Claus. As a very dear five-year-old confided to me, "There really is no Santa Claus, you know, but it's nice to play there is." The difficulty is one of language and even the *hoi polloi* in their actual beliefs are not as crude as their detractors would love to have them. There is no language for the expression of religious realities. One has to resort always to figures of speech, anthropomorphisms, if you please, to express spiritual truth. But this is equally true of any facts of the inner life, like music, or art, or the understanding of nature, or human love. The great realities of life yield to no verbal expression but only to insight and understanding. Figures of speech are the limping vehicle of expression for things most worth while. One could caricature and draw a laugh

out of the deepest expression of love made by his most beloved to our agnostic friend. To do so, however, is not only unseeing, it is also cheap and vulgar. The common mind, when it finds itself in the presence of things it cannot understand or does not wish to understand, can make an easy and satisfying jest out of the divinest things by assuming the unbelieving attitude. It seems sophisticated but is really unthinking.

The concept of God as a colossal man pictured after the manner of Gustave Doré is not generally held. It has been a long time since the Great Teacher declared that "God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit." Yet whoever has the hardihood to confess belief in God is commonly credited in sophisticated circles with all the anthropomorphisms of a God of hands and feet, of eyes and nostrils, despite the centuries-old declaration of theology that "He is without body or parts." This perverseness has kept many from a real understanding of the problem involved.

II.

God, Cosmic or Nothing

The main point of debate on the part of the serious-minded atheist is laid upon the problem of evil. Here is where he usually rests his case. If there were a good God he would never permit the evil and suffering there is in the world. It must be admitted both that this is the severest objection to theism and that it can never be solved academically. The problem of pain and evil is one of life and action and can be solved only by the affected individual who through the power of spirit can transmute it to higher values. Being an individual problem, it can be solved for society and the world of lesser forms only when the last

individual has won the solution. The agnostic bears so heavily on this point that one is tempted to call him a weeping evangelist of unfaith were there not contrasting points of humor in his attitude.

The nearest at hand of these is that while he denies the existence of God, because he feels so keenly the disparity of a good God and a suffering world, in few cases does he feel any disparity between a happy agnostic and a suffering world. The case is quite similar to that disparagement of Christian missions by some of our number, who have never lifted hand to help and yet overlook the social benefits conferred by the missionaries in schools, colleges, hospitals, and popular health education. Those whose condemnation is most complete are usually people who have never sacrificed a dollar or a comfort to do a like service. Their actions speak more loudly than their words. If such as these really felt so heavily the weight of the problem of evil, as they say, suicide would be sweeter far than life, but their distress at the problem seems to extend only to the denial of the existence of God, and a consequent comfortable feeling of release from moral and social responsibility.

The other point of humor lies in the failure of the unbeliever to realize that while the problem of evil faces the theist, the atheist is faced by the yet more difficult problem of goodness. If the hard and fast defender of the faith is now and then put to the seeming denial of the existence of evil, the agnostic is also thrust into the practical denial of goodness. Where there is no reality but matter and motion it is impossible to affirm the reality of moral values. These become but the illusion of a troubled dream. At one swoop all the things for which and by which men really live the superior life are done away, have no cosmic standing, are but the phantasms of diseased minds.

Thus it will be seen that the whole problem of God has widened out far beyond the region of simple belief into a matter of interpretation of the world of reality. It is impossible intelligently to hold to the God of caricature, whether it be the hateful, unjust provincial thing of religious superstition or the even more impossible straw God which the unbeliever sets forth for easy demolition. God is cosmic or nothing and this belief involves the whole question of the reality of goodness, and the nature of the universe.

III.

God as Goodness

The time has come when the theist should cease defending the problem of evil and should press forward the attack from the standpoint of the problem of good. For the concept of God is a positive concept which grows out of certain desirable aspirations and well-accredited facts of human life. The detractor who describes religion as an escape mechanism or as founded on fear has never taken the pains seriously to investigate the meaning of religion. Fear is an inhibitor of action as every psychologist knows, while religion is a release mechanism, an inspirer of the creative imagination and active in the highest degree.

The claim for the existence of God grows first of all out of the feeling that goodness has value and reality. It is primarily an acknowledgment of the reality of kindliness, of disposition to sacrifice the self for the common good, of that sense of moral integrity which refuses to profit by the misfortunes or degradation of one's fellows. The basis for theism is ultimately not something esoteric or far removed from life, but is fundamentally a belief in the reality of loyalty, of love, of uprightness, and self-

abnegation. It is true that these deeper qualities which make life worth living are often and perhaps usually possessed by those who claim to be disbelievers in God. In such a case their purported disbelief can be shown to be purely academic. In fact, they are religious. On the other hand, where one asserts belief in God and lacks these qualities, his faith can be shown to be purely academic, and worthless to the same degree. However fiercely he may deny it, he is an essential atheist.

But theism is not only the substantial maintenance of the reality of goodness; it goes deeper in that it asserts such goodness to be the normal aim of man and to possess a normal place in the cosmic order. To maintain this it is necessary to assume that the universe is itself friendly to goodness. This means nothing more nor less than to believe that goodness is positive and that evil is self-destructive; that man is right in living by his higher instincts rather than on the level of the baser and more animal. The theist is the man who believes that the highest possible goodness is paralleled by the highest possible self-realization and the completest form of life. This could not be true were it not that Nature or the power behind her is a creative Force having a mind to righteousness.

The proof of all this lies close at hand and does not depend on the appeal to revelation, to authorities of any kind except the authority of fact and life itself. Disuse or abuse of higher powers brings atrophy, refusal of the high calling anywhere in the scale of life brings degeneration. One may rail against the goodness of God for such deprivation; but on the whole this would appear to be a benevolent law of life which in the end will bring larger life to the larger number. What looks like unkindness to the individual may be the law of highest kindness to the species. Since

our agnostic friends are so fond of admonishing us of the insignificance of ourselves as individuals in the vast scheme of things, they should be the last of all to rail at God because for the individual "the wages of sin is death."

This brings us to the third essential of theistic belief. Holding that the universe is friendly, that the good life is the best life of self-realization, he looks upon evil and immorality as abnormality and disease. It is a pathological condition of the human personality, and it is self-destructive. Why should man not have been so created as to be base at will and still retain his self-respect? When thus put, these questions answer themselves, but they are the crux of the whole criticism of theism on the basis of the existence of evil. The only way we can spend and continue to have is to spend on the lower level and have on the higher. "What I saved I lost; what I spent I had; what I gave I have" was true not only of the dead Knight in Watts' picture; it is the incontrovertible and scientific law and fact of all life. We may be sorry this is so, wanting to eat our cake and keep it, but it is a demonstration of the inherent goodness of the universe and the reason for belief in God.

A fourth and cogent reason for the belief of the theist is the pragmatic one touched upon by Voltaire, when he declared the necessity in a decent society for the belief in God. This is the fact that unnumbered millions have found the concept of God a vital factor in working experience. It would be an easy matter for a non-mathematical mind to lampoon the logarithmic tables as a crazy jumble of figures. It is amazing how the mental idiot loves in fine bravado to proclaim the virtue of his idiocy by declaring: "It is all Greek to me." Such action brings applause from other idiots. Nevertheless, the wise mathematician will

continue to profit by the practical use of the tables in his computations. In like manner, the man who has not experienced God as the working factor in a more abundant life may proudly confess that the God of experience is nothing to him, and so assume that it cannot be a reality to any one else. He will raise a laugh from the like-minded and he gets pleasure out of announcing his religious idiocy. He can speak only for himself.

To the man who has come to lean on this "power not himself that makes for righteousness," who has found it the source of creative work, the provider of patience under calumny and discouragement, who by it has been enabled to get a better grip upon himself and to flee temptation to dishonor, has been doing something more than playing with an "escape mechanism." To him God is a reality of experience which nothing, not even a new psychology, can derogate or destroy. He knows the sustaining power of that help toward the higher ranges of life as surely as he knows the support of the cane that bears his physical weight.

This paper was begun from a chance remark which ran, "If there be a God." By that the speaker must have meant the caricatured God so freely bandied about in debate: the God of some far and lofty height more to be dreaded than loved. Whoever holds such a notion, however, does not hold the Christian concept. The gist of Christian teaching is that in the goodness, in the purity and loftiness of character, in the unselfishness of life which characterized one Man of Nazareth we have the full and unveiled presence and manifestation of God himself. This is taken by the Christian theist as the essential revelation and disclosure of the purposive and moral aim of the universe and the challenge of the individual personality to discover its normal self in the achievement of His likeness.

This is a concept which needs no further demonstration than is given in life. It cannot be refuted. It runs counter to no revelations in other faiths. It claims every man of good will as its veriest disciple.

In this truer sense we think the remark, "If there be a God" is quite synonymous with the conditional statements, "If there be such a thing as goodness," "If loyalty, love, self-abnegation and honesty are facts." None of our unbelieving friends but would defend these as hotly as any one. But if these are facts in our world, then our concept of the world must be widened to include them. If they are here they belong here, they are cosmic; if they are cosmic, the universe itself must possess a moral meaning, there is spiritual reality within all and over all. The theist calls this Supreme Creative Fact, source of the highest manifestations of life, God.

EDWIN MARKHAM: POET OF THE SOCIAL CONSCIENCE

By GEORGE RICHMOND GROSE

FOR more than a generation the soul of Edwin Markham has been sensitive to the aspirations and struggles of the people; and his verse, which throbs more poignantly with the mighty social impulses of our day than that of any other living American poet, is a needed tonic for the times. In an age of spiritual decadence he sounds a clarion call to return to sincerity and simplicity, to find the beauty in nature, the joy of humanity's kinship, and to

Draw down the New Republic held in air,
And make for it foundations on the earth.

To read understandingly the poetry of Edwin Markham he must be visualized in three geographical localities—in the pioneer community of Oregon City, his birthplace, in the Suisin hills of California, the scene of his young manhood days, and in the environs of New York City, where he now lives. Born in 1852, the poet has lived through two of the most creative periods in American history; and for sixty years he has been a comrade of the people. No poet has put more of the tang and color of his own life into his verse than has Markham. Like a mountain pool giving back in reflection the myriad colorings of skyscape and landscape, his sensitized soul reflects the infinite moods of nature and of men. Schooled in poverty and in hardship, nurtured in religion and in learning, aroused by the wistful restlessness and the human brutalities of his day, he became the most effective voice of the awakening social conscience of our age.

Edwin Markham is a true son of California. His writings are tuned to the spacious distances, to the rugged

mountains, to the majestic grandeur, to the paganly gorgeous colors, to the boundless enthusiasm of California. This child of nature found both the inspiration and the setting of many of his poems in nature. He belongs to the people of the soil. His soul was in tune with their toils and tears, with their hopes and struggles. "He bore their griefs and carried their sorrows." He was born into the estate of a social poet, and was not made to order. Edwin Markham is not an interpreter of nature as was Wordsworth, discovering the inner spirituality of natural actions and incidents. He is an ecstatic lover of nature whose soul bubbles and overflows in the presence of beauty and grandeur.

At the age of fourteen Markham's love of poetry was awakened by his teacher who introduced him to the great poets. At fifteen he began to write. At sixteen his dream of a new social order came to him through reading the New Testament Gospels. For the next twenty years his study and work as a teacher put him in training for his role as the poet-prophet of a social gospel. His biographer, William L. Stidger, aptly describes the social climate of the period when Markham began to write:

The world of poetry had become static. Walt Whitman had written his social poems, but the world had not caught the full implication of them. Joaquin Miller was writing in a stumbling, blundering fashion, trying to feel his way into some sort of social expression.

In 1899 when Edwin Markham published "The Man with the Hoe," he leaped into immortality. For seven years he had been saturating himself with social reform literature, notably the Gospels of Jesus, Victor Hugo, and the writings of Fourier and Lamennais. One day a friend showed him a copy of *Scribners Magazine* containing a

black-and-white illustration of Millet's "The Man with the Hoe." That was the kindling spark. Markham writes:

That picture held my soul as one is held by some
object of menace and terror. It haunted me like
some threat of eternal judgment. I could hear
Christ crying out from that ruin of a man.

He immediately jotted down in an old black note-book the first stanza of the poem:

Bowed by the weight of centuries he leans
Upon his hoe and gazes on the ground,
The emptiness of ages in his face,
And on his back the burden of the world.

Thirteen years passed before the poem was finished. Seeing Millet's original painting in San Francisco so enchanted the poet that he could think of nothing else. In four days more the immortal poem was completed, the form being determined by the first four lines, written thirteen years before. Never has the degradation of the working-man received a more terrific indictment:

Through this dread shape the suffering ages look;
Time's tragedy is in that aching stoop;
Through this dread shape humanity betrayed,
Plundered, profaned, and disinherited,
Cries protest to the Judges of the World,
A protest that is also prophecy.

For two years continuously the poem was discussed in periodicals and in literary circles. It has been translated into forty different languages, and has been published in more than 12,000 books and periodicals.

Next to "The Man with the Hoe," the poem by which Markham will be remembered, also voicing his fine ethical sense, is "Lincoln—The Man of the People." Henry Van Dyke says, "This is the greatest poem ever written on the immortal martyr, and the greatest that ever will be

written." In his interpretation of the character of the great American his moral passion flames:

One fire was in his spirit, one resolve—
To send the keen ax to the root of wrong,
Clearing a way for the feet of God.
And evermore he burned to do his deed
With the fine stroke and gesture of a king.

For sublime conception, penetrating interpretation, wealth of imagery, Markham's "Lincoln" belongs to immortal literature.

Edwin Markham interprets history not as the resistless drive of economic forces but as an age-long struggle for human rights, in which emerge titanic spiritual energies. In "The Desire of the Nations" he hails the Deliverer of oppressed peoples with passionate fervor:

He comes to make the long injustice right—
Comes to push back the shadow of the night,
The gray tradition full of flint and flaw—
Comes to wipe out the insults of the soul,
The insults of the Few against the Whole,
The insults they make righteous with a law.

He is always shouting his protest against the exploitation of the masses by the privileged few:

Unchangeable all lands and ages through;
Will it outlast the earth, outlast the sun—
The plunder of the Many by the Few?

He looks at the brutalized toiler, "The Hoe-man of the ages," with low brow, dull eye, and his soul flames with mingled fury and compassion:

Outcast and cursed, befooled and flayed,
With earth's brute-burdens on him laid.
How silent down the world he trod—
How patient he has been with God!

But his poems on social justice are more than the

protests of an aroused soul stinging with moral indignation against immemorial wrongs; they voice an unconquerable faith in the rise and triumph of the lowliest. This victorious note sings in every line of the "Sower," which was inspired by seeing Millet's painting:

This is the earth-god of the latter day,
Treading with solemn joy the upward way,
A lusty god that in some crowning hour
Will hurl gray Privilege from the place of power.

This is the world-will climbing to its goal,
The climb of the unconquerable soul.

The social sense which dominates Edwin Markham's verse has never the metallic ring of the agitator or propagandist. It breathes rather the deepest sympathy with human need and suffering. In his "Virgilia," we see the bending form, and the grief-lined face of a man under the shadow of a great sorrow, taking up again the tasks, and sharing the burdens of his fellows:

I will go back to the great world sorrow,
To the millions bearing the double load—
The fate of today and the fear of tomorrow:
I will taste the dust of the road.

I will go back to the pains and the pities
That break the heart of the world with moan:
I will forget in the grief of the cities
The burden of my own.

Profound as is Markham's interest in the toilers of the world, over-burdened and blighted by their labor, he is not the partisan of a class. His Christmas quatrain, "Outwitted," indicates the inter-racial and international sweep of his spirit:

He drew a circle that shut me out —
Heretic, rebel, a thing to flout.

But love and I had the wit to win:
We drew a circle that took him in.

Edwin Markham is a truly human poet. When did parent-hood find a truer voice?

Would that I could be by your side when you fall—
Would that my own heart could suffer it all.

Or the moral prophet sound a more challenging call?

“Courage! Life is but the stuff to try the soul upon.”
When has labor found a finer interpretation than in these words?—

“This is the plan:
More work: by more work we build the man.”
Has religious faith a surer note than this?

Here is the truth in a little creed,
Enough for all the way we go:
In love is all the law we need;
In Christ is all the God we know.

In one of his “Eighty Songs at Eighty,” the poet admirably summarizes his social creed:

Three things must a man possess if his soul would live
And know life’s perfect good—
Three things would the all-supplying Father give—
Bread, Beauty, and Brotherhood.

No interpretation of Edwin Markham’s social philosophy is adequate that does not take account of the place in his life which religion has held. His religious experience began in early youth under the nurture of the Church of the Disciples. His faith grew with his growing mind, and became the deepest purpose and passion of his life. He took religion seriously. It was the day of highpowered emotionalism in the churches. Later the emotional elements of Markham’s early faith were turned into the channel of a social gospel. When he became the prophet of social

righteousness his religious ideas became broader, but his faith lost none of its intensity. His confession of faith is convincing:

The Gospel of Jesus is the one thing that has had the most profound influence in my life. I see in Jesus the supreme statesman and lawgiver of the nations. His words are all in logic of the universe. . . . Upon the ephemeral "IS" presses the eternal "OUGHT." Behind this "OUGHT" presses the shoulder of God; and under that pressure all things change. What ought to be will be—this is my faith.

When his last book was published, *Eighty Songs at Eighty*, John Haynes Holmes said of the poet:

Edwin Markham is America's poet laureate—an honor received not by official appointment but by universal acclaim. He walks in the succession of great poets, who are also prophets, and has voiced more truly and beautifully than any other singer the ideals of America and of this modern age.

In "The Need of the Hour," he sounds the battle cry of modern times:

What do we need to keep the nation whole,
To guard the pillars of the state? We need
The fine audacities of honest soul,
The swift temerities that take the part
Of outcast right—the wisdom of the heart.
We need the faith to go a path untrod,
The power to be alone and vote with God.

Idealist as he is, Edwin Markham is no washed-out sentimentalist. He faces the grim facts of a brutalizing industrial order in all their stark realism, but he sees ever the "eternal sunrise". "There is great hope," he declares, "of establishing a truly Christian society, one in which the cold, hard tools of industry will be transformed into instruments

of the glorious Christ." He believes that the old order is knocked to pieces by the world-wide chaos, and that this is a good omen of the establishment of a new social order—"a spiritual industry in which the spirit of Jesus is in all the wheels."

In this present age no more courageous voice than Edwin Markham's has been raised in protest against "immemorial infamies, perfidious wrongs" of human society,

A protest that is also prophecy.
He is ever calling to the toilers for a better world,
Come, let us live the poetry we sing.

PARADOX

By VIRGINIA TAYLOR MCCORMICK

Life is a strange commingling of reality and dreams,
More simple, yet more complex, than it seems.
I have felt the beast triumphant in a man
Preaching Jesus and his love;
From a tramp asking bread
Wisdom of Solomon I have heard.
Felons have looked to me as kind
As Mary's husband when they smiled,
And once I saw upon a Naples street
A harlot die to save a stranger child.

In unaccustomed places I have known
Sleep pillowing upon a stone.
Fireless, without shelter, I have warmed
My heart by beauty of cold stars.
In my small garden I have found
All of heaven in the larkspur's blue,
God in a violet's drop of dew.

AN INQUIRY INTO SYMBOLISM

By EMILE CAILLIET

La Nature est un temple où de vivants piliers
Laissent parfois sortir de confuses paroles;
L'homme y passe à travers des forêts de symboles
Qui l'observent avec des regards familiers.

Baudelaire.

HAVING had one day the ambition to understand *Le Bateau Ivre* of Rimbaud, I almost immediately encountered the problem of symbolism. What is a symbol? I turned the matter in my mind, and found no clear answer. Dictionaries and technical works only added to my confusion: they spoke indeed of the symbolism of poets, but also of that of impressionistic painters, of Hegelian philosophers, of cathedral builders, of mystics, mathematicians, chemists . . . and others too numerous to remember.

I had begun to unravel a thread but the skein was tangled. I refused the Gordian solution.

Thence there proceeded a research of fifteen years, in which the reading of an article by Ribot in the *Revue Philosophique*¹ gave me the point of departure. This eminent psychologist wrote:

The symbol appeared with the origin of humanity; that was even its golden age. Since then, if it has retreated and weakened under the antagonistic pressure of rational thought, growing progressively with the interpretation of experience through reason, it is nevertheless still not extinguished.

¹ Cf. *La Pensée symbolique*, in *Revue philosophique*, année 1915, p. 385 sq.

And farther on :

the symbolists of different countries, Belgians, English, French, come back by a sharpened and refined sympathy to the primitive period of naive animism in which everything in nature has life, sight and voice: in which, as one of them says, "the real world takes on the semblance of fairy-land"²

From that time, the road to be followed was clear to me; starting with the observation of a primitive society still imprisoned in its narrow horizons, and following there the growth and then the evolution of a complete flora of native symbols, without ever depriving myself of the resources of the comparative method whenever such comparison should be justified, I had to note these data in that spirit of submission to fact that Claude Bernard has so successfully analyzed. Armed thus with a working hypothesis and having begun a conversation with nature, I could not allow myself to be disconcerted should the interview take an unexpected turn, or a long detour.

My time being limited, I shall spare you the tortuous itinerary which was to result from this attitude, and I shall confine myself to presenting you with a sketch of the conclusions arrived at.

First, it seems to me certain that symbolism is inseparable from primitive mentality.

Primitive mentality, in turn, seems to be that of a humanity with a decided bent for the sense-formed appearances of reality, and mystically related to them in such degree as to be unable to separate itself except in a very imperfect way.

In fact such appeared to me certainly to be the mental-

² Article quoted, p. 398.

ity of the social group amid which the search began,—during a period of study of about four years on the island of Madagascar. My research there included observation of the people, of their customs, of their oral traditions—work carried on by personal contacts and in the native tongue—revealing social groups linked by a sort of symbiosis, to the environment in which it has been imprisoned since time immemorial. From this symbiotic mentality extend a thousand networks of participation of the native mind with nature which show themselves in a luxurious growth of symbols. Already while following the slow rumination of a primitive being in contact with the ancient earth and its mysterious influences, it occurs to one to think of the *Faune* of Mallarmé, whose body is sensitively inseparable from the surrounding vegetative life. Symbols which are born in “the mass”, the enveloping life, of “ancient night” which shadows such a mind, recall in fact those “subtle branches” of which the poet speaks, and which remain “the very woods themselves”.¹

On the horizon which until then had held prisoner the primitive society under consideration, strangers one day appeared. Overtaken in a hundred ways, the natives found themselves uprooted. Their collective notions suffered violences which altered them. These notions were in part, the outcome of a mental activity naturally permeated with the spirit of play, in which the forms of directed thought were dimly seeking to assert themselves. With foreign invasion this faun-like innocence of thought began to give way to the strong constraint imposed by a more commanding culture. Up to that time the budding thinker had been the prisoner of an experience which got its character only from a certain sector of reality which furnished him with the

¹ Cf. Mallarmé, *Après-midi d'un Faune*.

substance of his metaphors. This metaphoric currency was limited to the social group under consideration. This group once out passed, in order to maintain the validity of such a coinage, it would then be a question of forced currency which must soon necessitate many recoinings of the collective symbols, to attain the degree of uniformity that a general circulation requires. When scarcely realized, the clear-cut concepts thus obtained would be obliterated by the wider usage possible, just as the effigy on a coin is worn off through greater circulation. Certainly the concept then put into circulation would be full of the constituent elements of the original symbol, gold or silver or some baser metal which retains its value after the goddess-like France or King George V has been effaced by usage.

It seemed to me however, that from the symbol to the concept there was an abrupt change. *In this sense, the concept appears as a symbol which has been submitted to violence.* Thus among non-civilized peoples, the intrusions of intensive civilizations have interrupted an experience of participation which already understood the art of its own self-suggestion—a natural art of native resource. Forgetting for an instant the frightful aspects of primitive life, I have discovered a part of the truth in the astounding phrase of Renan, in which the life of the natives of the South Seas is likened to a joyous idyll. The carefree hours seem indeed to constitute the normal tonality of these tribes who, in their music, are ignorant of the minor key.

It is to this natural aptitude for—shall we call it, the native *dilettantism* of the human mind—that the constraint of civilization does violence. For here civilization appears to operate against nature; though it is true that the human animal does not allow himself to be “depraved” without strong resistance.

Leaving now the domain of the "prelogical" and of the "mystical," as Professor Lévy-Bruhl would say, in which symbols knew their golden age, the newly civilized man enters into the domain of directed thought. From then on he is conscious of his ideal, which consists in isolating his mind from all contingencies, in liberating himself from his environment and from his group by Culture and Knowledge. As he enters larger and larger groups, he tends toward the more universal thought. The symbols which he employed formerly to suggest such and such a state of mind to any one of his fellow men, have henceforth lost all their living substance. Colorless, shrunken, classified, defined clearly and distinctly, they take on the aspect of intelligible concepts circulating in gradually expanded territories. They are now translated by objective signs: *for the symbol is lost in the objective sign at the moment when thought is depersonalized by socialization.*

What is it, then, that in the first stage animated the symbol? To enable myself to reach a conclusion on this subject a counter-question had to be raised. Thus I must ask myself how and in what conditions a symbol could be born again?

Now it appears that a symbol can live again if, an entire local determination of experience being restored, the impulse from which it has proceeded can be recaptured. Certainly it was this impulse which first had related the symbol to the environment, with even some slight discretion, however, aided by the fluidity of the symbol as well as by the atmosphere of "mysticism" where each symbol is adept in making again for itself an existence in a new environment. What is important, then, is to maintain contact with the generative reality. But this reality, which is our experience

of life itself, is it not, in its principal aspects, always like unto itself?

From the very asking of this question, I realized that such and such a fundamental motive for symbolism is found again and again in different parts of the globe, without necessarily implying migration or transplanting of the symbol. Much the more certainly, because the human animal, subject of every symbol, is constituted alike in all climates.

At this point of my inquiry I was led to relegate to second importance the determinism imposed by environment, in order to turn my attention to the human faculty of symbolization hitherto neglected.

This conclusion imposed itself: that even in his highest flights toward the intelligible, man remains by nature a symbolistic animal, from the very fact that he "thinks" nature with his whole body. At the origin of our most daring speculations, is found the experience of our fraternity with the world surrounding us, a world which we recreate in our own image by experiencing it. The fact that we submit our own conclusions to a more and more generalized criticism does not change anything as to this point of departure. Formerly Zola valued highly a so-called law of impregnation, according to which, once pregnant, a woman was supposed to carry her husband with her everywhere. This simple theory makes us smile today. But for the moment, I should like to borrow it from the museums of physiology and apply it to the human animal, who carries everywhere with him this experience of primordial participation with the real that makes of us symbolistic animals.

Clearly there is implied that what seems to animate the symbol, in final analysis, is the sense of participation. To

me the symbol should be defined as *the sign of a participation experienced or suggested*. In fact, it is impossible to separate the experience from the process; inter-changes are incessant between the two; it stands as clear that I must be unable to suggest an experience which is strange to me. In this connection, sincerity is the first condition of symbolistic art, which latter has greatly suffered from the fact that would-be artists have seen in the processes of suggestion employed, only the opportunity of being vague and of disguising the insufficiency of their technique.

Far from proceeding from contemporary idealism, the so-called Symbolistic Movement in Poetry marks a reaction against it. From this point of view, it is decidedly *anti-modern* in the sense that Jacques Maritain gives to this word. While the Cartesian reform, in which is consummated the divorce of mind from being, has its final term in Hegelian logic, where being is identified with nothingness, symbolism rediscovers a sense of participation with being.

Doubtless this fact escapes attention at first. What seems to strike the observer, what impressed contemporaries of the Symbolist Movement in France at the end of the nineteenth century—the Barrés of *Taches d'encre*, for example—is that the symbolist generation is in many respects a depressed generation. It is indeed from this lassitude that the rupture with the century proceeds. The rebels, who often labour under a metaphysical agony more or less well “suppressed,” voluntarily seek their refuge in the frenzy of the senses. So they rediscover states of consciousness of an unheard-of wealth. It is thus that our repentant civilized individuals, by cultivating the disorder of their minds, return to an experience of participation which recalls that of the primitives.

This frenzy of the senses in vain makes our imagists pass for materialists: their materialism is farther from nothingness than contemporary idealism. What constitutes the symbol, as was just said, is a sense of participation; and such an experience turns the symbolists toward being.

A sentiment of fraternity with a living environment is found in most of the symbolistic poets. Far from giving them the calm of plenitude, however, it causes a great nostalgia to be born in their souls. The "dandy" Baudelaire is tormented by it as is the "scoundrel" Rimbaud; it is because he has suggested it so many times in his works that Verlaine is so human; Laforgue would find life less ordinary if he could liberate himself from its obsession.

The epic of the symbolist generation could not find a more expressive symbol than "*Le Bateau Ivre*" of Rimbaud. When the Boat breaks its moorings, one would like to cry, in the manner of Goethe at the battle of Valmy: "Dating from here and today begins a new epoch in the history of the world!" It pleases us to see in Symbolism the premonitory signs of a new Renaissance in the land of Descartes.

Impatient to be cleansed of human stains, the boat feels itself constrained between the banks. At last there it is on the ocean. The liberation is made more complete, under the night strewn with stars reflected by the water, so that the boat also drifts "between two firmaments." However, impatient of the infinite, it feels itself tormented with a need to dilate, to the point of bursting its hull. Just like the adolescent Rimbaud here symbolized: urged toward the valley of the Meuse, promiser of a freedom as yet forbidden, the young man finally takes to the sea, throwing himself, unwearied, into the far reaches of two continents; then finally the spiritual birth, in sorrow, of this "mystic in the savage state" who is to inspire Claudel.

Claudel! We are now in the open. The attribute replaces the image and the expression can no longer be mistaken for the essence. What produces that which is most intimate in us and in our surroundings, being itself, is God, the Supreme Reality. The principle rediscovered, the sense of dependency is restored, and with it, an entire hierarchy reaching toward the light. From now on Henri Bremond will be able to exalt his notion of "*Poesie pure*".

Certainly we should not know how to make out of the symbolist generation a galaxy of saints; but it remains true that the line of force of the movement is directed toward God. Not toward the 'God of Philosophers and Scholars', but toward the God of Jesus Christ. It is a whole generation which reacts against contemporary idealism, in order to return to a sort of primitiveness in which symbolistic thought, and consequently symbolistic art again finds a golden age. Time does not allow me to tell you to what extent I have been able to establish point by point a parallel between the procedures of symbolistic art and those of primitive men. While undertaking that I have never lost sight of the fact that these processes are inseparable from an experience of participation by which a "mystic" mentality is characterized.

This return to reality, rich in a wealth of states of consciousness, marks a natural reaction against that atmosphere of evil lassitude due to defeat, invasion, internal struggles, excesses of positivism and naturalism which characterized the France of the end of the nineteenth century. By contact with the nourishing soil the poets rediscovered a richness of impressions which their art strove to suggest, with all its native freshness, to so many contemporaries who were perishing on an "arid and waterless" earth.

What seems to have misled theorists and critics—and even the artists involved—is this endeavor to explain symbolism by a logic which has taken from Hegel's lessons in obscurity, while the movement itself marks essentially a return to a "mystic" experience of participation. The latter, in turn, implies a divorce between the symbolist artist and a whole tradition of modern philosophy originating with Descartes. In this circumstance the irrational could not be declared inferior to the rational, because in Verlaine, in Rimbaud, in Claudel, even in Mallarmé, it regains a richness of immediate sensation, even greater than what it lost in its revolt against a dessicating individualism.

The symbolistic artist may thus lose in clarity, but he does not care for clear and distinct ideas if, for their sake, he is to sacrifice to the criterion of evidence that which is his own, that which in him is most intimate.

The symbolistic artist is a complete man, who experiences that Man is infinitely superior to man, and that there are in creation vastly more things than our human limitations allow us to know. His profound sympathy, behind the aspects of reality, plunges to the sources of being.

From this enrichment which comes to him all at once, in this beneficial return into himself, he happens to draw pride. As if there could be in us anything which is not given to us! The sigh which Valéry sees at the end of every thought, is found in fact, at the origin of every consciousness that is opened to these springs of living water which have been polluted by the depravities of our civilization.

These conclusions apply to Mallarmé himself. To explain his design and art by an Hegelianism which conciliates Logic and Reality on the higher plane of the Idea, is to misconstrue. Let us consider from now on—and in spite of

him—the author of the *Afternoon of a Faun* as a genial decivilized man, who has gone back to the wealth of the state of mind of a primitive, with—and here is the only corrective which I find pertinent—the ambitions and technical resources that centuries of civilization have given him.

Toward the end of the century, in France as well as abroad, men of letters found themselves closely associated with artists. Allow me to refer you to two volumes *Men and Memories* by William Rothenstein¹ which present in an unusually vivid manner the relations between painters, poets, and critics in England and France. Briefly: the processes of symbolism have widely overrun the domain of poetry; literary symbolism proves itself to be inseparable from Impressionism. Or rather it is the same movement which expresses itself now by lyric poetry, now by music, dancing, painting, and sculpture. You will recall that, in his artistic ambition, the author of the *Afternoon of a Faun* dreamed of combining all these means of expression into a total Suggestion. The thought occurs to me that the motion picture, with all its resources of setting, of color, of music, and of spoken language, is very near to realizing the artistic ambition of Mallarmé.

Bringing then my attention more particularly to painting, there I have seen confirmed once more, that idea of symbolism which has been determined in the course of my inquiry, *in which the symbol-making process proves to be inseparable from the experience of participation.*

With Turner, Van Gogh, Monet or Gauguin, we come back to the midst of nature, rejecting, along with conventions, rules, and platitudes, an entire disciplinary intellec-

¹ *Men and Memories*, Recollections of William Rothenstein, 1872-1900 New York Coward-McCann, Inc. 1931.

tualism. Objects cease to be stereotyped, their forms have no longer anything controlled. We see nature in spots of light and shade; in rings of blond luminosity which trembles before resolving itself into tints, in a gamut of colors, in a rustling of grasshoppers which brings a warm breeze laden with the odors of hay. It is necessary to transfer to canvas the powerful suggestions of this intoxication of the sense experience, this symphony of impressions of which the theme is the fraternity of man with things, all under God's great sky.

Impressionism lies therein.

A last and to me verifying testimony to these conclusions on Symbolism was given to me by our young Californian artist, Millard Sheets. Recently he was led to make an inquiry into the teaching of design and painting in the schools of Los Angeles. One evening he was kind enough to show me the collection that he had gathered and to comment upon it. A strange thing was discovered; it was among the very young kindergarten children that the best work was found. There veritable geniuses were revealed who proved in all their richness and suggested with perfect candor the thousands of participations that united them to beings and to things. As we went farther along into the higher grades, artificiality and convention falsified the compositions. On arriving at the high schools, the ruin was complete. What Millard Sheets had shown me was, briefly, the tragedy of our modern culture and of the education which propagates it.

But also the observations of our Californian painter (whose genius, as also that of all the young American school which is so promising, proceeds from this "bath of life" that Impressionism has given us) these observations,

I say, brought me new confirmation of my views on the symbolistic Renaissance.

It was at that point in my reflections that the voice of Millard Sheets broke the silence to give me the final word:

“Did I tell you that my son Owen has also begun to paint?” The fact that the little fellow is only four years old is far from hindering his efforts. The other day he ran to his mother, exhibiting with pride the enormous, threatening, black and red monster which he had just scrawled: “Look, Mother,” he exclaimed, “Look at this train I’ve made; it’s not like that that it seems but it’s like that that it is!”

I do not know if you can share my opinion, but I would voluntarily give the whole *Logic* of Hegel for that remark!

INTERPRETATION

By JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM

EXPERIENCE issues in a twofold self-completion—Interpretation (including evaluation) and Expression. Experience passes into interpretation as naturally as the branch breaks into leaf, and into expression (including conduct) as spontaneously as the bud opens into the flower,—and together they bring forth fruit. Although one or the other may predominate, each involves the other. Interpretation is a form of expression; expression is a form of interpretation. Yet each is something that the other is not. Interpretation is rather the intellectual unfolding and elucidation of experience; expression its imaginative, aesthetic and active out-flowering and fruitage.

The interpretation of experience is Philosophy; the expression of experience is Art.¹ Over against these stands Science, as the explication and organization of phenomena, including the facts of experience regarded as phenomena. For all experiences, even the most inner, private and spiritual, are, by virtue of their occurrence in a psycho-physical being and in a physical world, also phenomena. In fact much of recent Psychology is attempting to reduce all forms of spiritual experience to sensations only—agitations of the nervous organism. This, however, is but a self-correcting extravagance and will pass.

Logic as Interpretation

The essential and universal process by which experience issues in interpretation is Logic.² All the forms of

¹ In its larger aspects Art includes all forms of mechanical, educational, vocational and household arts.

² The term Logic is used in its wider sense as embracing all the instruments, processes and laws of thought including language and grammar as well as ideology.

Logic are instruments of interpretation, including concepts, categories, ideas, the judgment, the proposition, analysis, synthesis, hypothesis, analogy, inference, contradiction, contrariety, contrapletion and the rest. Logic, as the Science of Thought, is shared by both Philosophy and Science. In this respect Natural Science is interpretation and hence philosophical, but only instrumentally and secondarily such, its aim being not interpretation (meaning) but explanation, concerned i.e. not with interior but with exterior meanings and relations. It is only recently, comparatively speaking, that Scientists (i.e. natural scientists) have awakened, with something of a start, to the dependence of Science upon Logic and thus to its relation to Philosophy *per se*.

The judgment, for example, whether quantitative, or qualitative, affirmative, negative, or hypothetical, is interpretive. It states something about a phenomenon or experience, clarifies, relates, or evaluates it. Interpretation is indeed *interpretation*. It is discovery of relations—relations of an entity within itself and beyond itself. This requires analysis, followed by synthesis in an ever-enlarging progress toward ultimate interpretation.

It is not possible here to go into the nature of ultimate interpretation. Let us rather turn to an endeavor to trace the process of interpretation as it moves from simpler to more complete forms and thus toward a comprehensive whole.

Concept-forming as Interpretation

The simplest form of definite interpretation is the concept, or universal. The formation of percepts by which units of experience are distinguished and connected belongs rather to the implicit intuitive activity of mind than to

interpretation. The concept, too, is a direct product of mental activity. It emerges from experience immediately, almost inevitably, constituting thus the primary unit of language.

While the rational core of conception is inherent in experience, concepts are thus its essential products, without which experience would be impotent and speechless. For example, I taste a peach, or a pear, and experience an agreeable sensation which I at once connect with a similar sensation from other fruits and foods and say: it is *sweet*. This adjectival concept involves the noun-concept *sweetness* which thereby universalizes the sensation. Philosophy thereupon pronounces sweetness an essence or "eternal object," and assigns it a place among subsistence-reals. What is gained thereby? Much; for through such essences as sweetness, sourness, pleasantness, unpleasantness, and the like, my experience and yours takes its place in a great organized inter-related body of conceptual knowledge which gives us an ordered and communicable world of sensation-essences and ideational-subsistences. For this reason words and names are of the utmost consequence. "Like a good Englishman," writes Galsworthy in *The Patrician*, "he recognized that if you once let things get away from their names, they ceased to be facts, and if they ceased to be facts they became—the devil."

It is a striking characteristic of essence-concepts that they bear no resemblance whatever to that in sensation which they represent. Sweetness, e.g., as a concept, has no resemblance to the taste that it designates. Nor do the color concepts in the least resemble color sensations.

Where we say for example that a leaf is green, we ought surely to see in this cognition just merely a perceptual image of the material

existence, if the meaning of the word "green" itself were green. But that is quite out of the question. The meaning of the word green is not even sensually perceptible in the way the word green is, to say nothing indeed of the green leaf, and it can therefore under no circumstances pass as an image of the recognized green object. How further with the help of the meaning of the word "green" a cognition of the green object consisting only of intuitive perception [and] imaging [it] forth is to take place, remains wholly unintelligible, and theoretical intuitionism accordingly runs aground already in the instances in which one could be the most disposed to adhere to it.¹

The conclusion to be drawn from this fact is that in passing from the sense-experience, by way of the percept to the concept, a transition is made from one level of reals to another—quite other—and yet there is an inherent relation between them that requires the transition to be made on the part of the being (man) who dwells in both realms. Sensation and thought are in constant interplay. The concept *sweetness* calls up the corresponding sensation and *vice versa*. Similarly the *peach* calls up the image of a peach and the image revives the taste, or sensation, of the peculiar kind of sweetness that a peach has.²

Turning to another field of experience, let us say that you are thrown in with one to whom you are drawn by a feeling of admiration and affection and one day you say to him: "John, let us be friends!" In saying this you do

¹ "Wo wir z. B. sagen, dass ein Blatt grün ist, dürften wir in dieser Erkenntnis doch nur dann ein anschauliches Abbild des sinnlichen Seins sehen, wenn die Bedeutung des Wortes 'grün' selber grün wäre. Gerade davon aber ist keine Rede. Die Bedeutung des Wortes grün ist nicht einmal in der Weise sinnlich wahrnehmbar wie das Wort grün, geschweige denn wie das grüne Blatt, und sie kann daher unter keinen Umständen als ein Abbild des erkannten grünen Gegenstandes gelten. Wie also mit Hilfe der Bedeutung des Wortes 'grün' eine nur aus Anschauung bestehende, abbildende Erkenntnis des grünen Gegenstandes zustande kommen soll, bleibt völlig unverständlich, und der theoretische Intuitionismus scheitert demnach bereits in den Fällen, in denen man am meisten geneigt sein könnte, an ihm festzuhalten." Heinrich Rickert, "Kennen und Erkennen," *Kantstudien*, Band XXXIX, Heft 2, 1934, p. 145.

² In a certain sense essences may be termed "eternal", as Whitehead calls colors eternal.

not need to discourse to him on what friendship means. The term carries its meaning within itself. Everyone knows something of what friendship, as an experience, implies.

What, then, does the concept *friendship* do to the experienced feeling that arises between you? It takes the feeling up into the realm of understanding—illuminates it, relates it more widely, gives it added meaning through the fact that this feeling of friendliness is a well established and understood human relationship, something that can be segregated from other experiences and then re-related to them and to the realm of human experience as a whole. The experience of friendliness is thus, to a large extent, interpreted through the very term itself.

The Relation of Concepts to Persons

While concepts interpret experience, experience in turn interprets concepts. Friendship is a very old and well-known experiential concept. You had read and heard about it and its values often; but not until you found your own friend did you know what it really meant as an experience. Yet you would not now know its meaning so well, had not the concept already been known to you as the formula and vehicle of a well-established and honored human experience. You knew that friendship was something that David and Jonathan had, Damon and Pythias, Socrates and Plato, Wordsworth and Coleridge, Tennyson and Hallam. In a sense, also, *it had them*. And yet friendship is not something of, and by, itself, an eternal subsistence or moral value apart from persons—an entity or *ding-an-sich*, which, searching for some two congenial minds to whom to attach itself, discovers certain pairs of humans and forthwith makes friends of them. No, the friends just instanced were born, grew up, and developed personalities of their own,

before their friendships were formed. They, as selves, existed before their particular friendships, although not anterior to friendship itself as a human experience. Yet, on the other hand, human selves precede friendship and every other human experience, individual and social, and the concepts interpreting their experiences. Selves and their experiences are, of course, coexistent. Yet in the hierarchy of values, as well as in logical priority, selves are primary. Persons, that is, are inherently more real than their experiences. First, in order of reality, selves, persons; then experience; then interpretation of experience. Such is the order of precedence,—at least logically and ontologically.

Value-Concepts

It would be, however, a very inadequate interpretation of experience that failed to realize that, as factors in the realm of persons, concepts have a certain reality of their own, of different kinds and degrees. There is a class of concepts of so inherently vital and potent a nature—such as the universal Value-Forms, the Good, the True and the Beautiful—as to constitute what may justly be called Intrinsic Reals. These Value-Reals, or “Ideas,” have a quasi-autonomous existence. They both *have* a history and *make* history, so to speak, as Professor Whitehead has so graphically pointed out in his *Adventures of Ideas*. Such commanding concepts e.g. as Reason, Truth, Freedom, Democracy, Patriotism, have moulded the ideals and controlled the destinies of peoples and generations. The three dynamic concepts, *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*, caused the most violent, if not the most eventful, revolution in history. In themselves alone, such concepts are pure nonentities, but actively present in the souls of men and women, individual and corporate, they possess incalculable reality, power and

perdurance. Yet even these universal Value-Forms come into being and fulfill their meaning and mission only in persons and are subordinate to them in reality.

Categories as Interpretation

Equally universalizing and potent with concepts, in the interpretation of experience, are *Categories*. These, although, like the poor, always with us (and often as badly treated), are not easily systematized and tabulated. As deduced (i.e. drawn out of experience) by Kant they are twelve in number, arranged in four divisions: Quantity (unity, plurality, totality), Quality (reality, negation, limit between these), Relation (substance and accident, cause and effect, action and reaction), Modality (possibility, impossibility, actuality, non-actuality, necessity, non-necessity). If we add Time and Space, which Kant called intuitive forms of experience, it will be seen at once how constantly and inevitably we use categories in interpreting experience, yet how imperfectly.¹

One person may say of Friendship e.g., (employing the category *change*) Friendship changes, while another (using the complementary category *Stability*) may say, Friendship endures. Confronted by this paradox, the puzzled mind is not satisfied until—employing the categories both of Quantity and Quality—it recognizes that *some* friendships change and *others* endure, or that friendship changes in some respects and in other respects continues unchanged. Without the interpretive instrumentality of categories, experience in its higher ranges would be simply inchoate and unevaluated.

¹ Whitehead enumerates eight categories of existence, twenty-seven of explanation and nine categorial obligations.

Ideas as Interpretation

Supplementing and fulfilling Concepts and Categories, in the enlarging interpretation of experience, are *Ideas*. An idea is a judgment, by means of concepts and categories, concerning experience.¹ For example, when one makes one of the assertions concerning friendship already referred to, or the still more pertinent one, *friendship enriches personality*, he constructs, or accepts, an idea, in the form of a proposition. There are, of course, all kinds of ideas, good and bad, useful and useless, deep and shallow; but the idea, as such, is something of and by itself which interprets experience in a wider way than a concept alone can do. When one says, "friendship enriches personality," he gives to the interpretation of the experience not only the value of the *concept*, friendship, but that of a *judgment*, relating friendship vitally to another concept *personality* by means of the qualitative category of *enrichment*.

Idea-patterns as Interpretation

Beyond ideas, in the enlargement and fulfillment of interpretation, lie Idea-systems, or *Idea-patterns*, by means of which ideas are related to cognate ideas in such a way as to extend the area of the meaning of experience indefinitely. For example, if one says: *there can be no true friendship without personal honor and loyalty, and these depend upon moral and religious motives*, he has begun to form an idea-system which involves many ideas, related in differing contexts. Every distinctive interest and pursuit in human life has its idea-system—each separate philosophy, science, art, craft, form of employment, recreation—from metaphysics and astronomy to engineering and golf. These all develop idea-patterns and nomenclatures of their

¹ This definition of idea confines it, as already indicated, to the higher order of concepts.

own which only their initiates can fully understand and use.

Thus we have traced in outline the process by which experience passes into ever widening interpretation, by means of concepts, categories, ideas and idea-systems, the whole process resulting from the activity of rational selves.

The Values of Interpretation

We have been engaged hitherto, mainly, with the consideration of the nature and forms of the interpretation of experience. Let us now turn to a more definite consideration of the *values* of interpretation.

The first value of interpretation, as has already been pointed out, is that it *clarifies experience*. The need of this is at once apparent. Experience uninterpreted (and it is far too inadequately interpreted) would be meaningless and perplexing. In Kant's familiar saying: "Concepts without percepts are empty; percepts without concepts are blind." To name a thing is to universalize it and thus give it added significance. "A rose by any other name would smell as sweet." Not quite, dear Shakespeare; at least *nameless* it would not be so sweet, for all the accumulated poetic meaning attached to its name adheres to each freshly blooming rose. Every experience is what it is, in part, because of its conceptualized nature. Take physical pain, for example. If when one is seized with pain he did not know that it is pain, i.e. abnormal (involving the concept of abnormality), that it has a cause (involving the category of causation), that there may be a possible cure (the concept of recovery), how much greater would be his distress and how helpless he would be—especially if everyone else were as ignorant of these interpretive conceptions as he.

This fruitful use of concepts is obviously confined to the human mind. The animal e.g. has the experience of pain, but no power to interpret it, and therefore to heal it (beyond purely instinctive measures). Fortunately for the animal its nervous system is less sensitive than ours, and less abused, and its pain therefore is less acute and less needful of interpretive analysis and consequent treatment conditioned upon the employment of concepts.

All of our experiences require clarification, both for theoretical and practical purposes. We need to think about them, and to think clearly. Too little or too narrow or prejudiced thought about experience lands us in disaster, theoretical and practical. Since every man philosophizes, interprets his experience and that of others, he should learn to do this as well as possible,¹ and thus avoid the disturbing consequences which we are soon to consider.

Another value of interpretation is that it not only clarifies experience but *enriches* it. I mean of course when the experience is a worth-while one. Take the experience of listening to a great piece of music. A responsive person will feel the music, experience it, enjoy it, however little he can appreciate it. But suppose he knows music understandingly—its different movements, tempos, forms of expression—how greatly his experience will be deepened and widened! Experience gains incalculable enrichment from adequate interpretation.

The Disvalues and Dangers of Interpretation

Interpretation, like all good things, is not, however, without its serious perversions and perils. To these we now turn briefly.

In the first place, when carried beyond its proper function

¹ Cf. "Everyman a Philosopher" by the present writer, *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1935.

and limits, interpretation saps the vitality of experience and transforms its green and flowering fields into barren wastes. Shakespeare has described this result in the words of the soliloquizing Hamlet: "The native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." When reflection inhibits dutiful action the result is disastrous. Normally, thought does not do this. Instead of inhibiting action, reflection gives it intelligent incitement, steadiness and guidance. But if reflective interpretation becomes a substitute for dutiful and expressive action it fails to fulfil its true office.¹

Furthermore, in spite of the fact that interpretation normally illumines experience there is something in the experience itself that cannot be put completely into the interpretation—the tang and flavor of it, so to speak. Realization requires *expression*, as well as interpretation, and even that does not wholly succeed. This is uniquely expressed in a succinct line of Browning's "*The Last Ride Together*":

"Sing, riding's a joy. For me, I ride."

However vivid the thought, imagination, or recollection, of an experience, the experience itself excels it. One of the functions of interpretation, as of expression, is to catch, retain and reproduce, as well as illumine, as much of the experience itself as possible. If one had to choose between an enjoyable experience and a description of it, why the choice is clear. But happily one can have both—at least partially—and the one enhances the other. A great part of the value of interpretation is to crystallize experience and make it capable of recall. Summon the concepts, or patterns, that describe, or interpret, experience and back

¹ "To know and to understand conceptually are two different things, are often even mutually exclusive and contrasted" R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 139.

come the images, and thus the experience itself, for fresh appreciation and evaluation.

Yet, on the other hand, interpretation may cloak and obscure, as well as misinterpret, the experience out of which it arises. For the structure and activity of the human mind is such that concepts and ideas and systems of ideas give rise to other concepts and ideas, linked by logical processes and sequences, until one may wander far from the home of experience into a desert land of abstraction and vain intellection.¹ For example, a philosopher experiences the unity of apperception in the activity of his own mind, and thus unifies all the phenomena of the world about him, and losing all sense of diversity at length concludes that unity is the sole and constitutive characteristic of reality and becomes an absolutist, ignoring the aspects of experience that make another thinker a pluralist. Thus ensues the ever renewed conflict of Monism vs. Pluralism, and experience is forced from the arena and retires into "innocuous desuetude," lost in the clash of ideas emerging from it.

Yet the corrective for dessicated interpretation is not (as is too easily inferred) to stay always close to the home-base of experience itself—though that may be best for many minds—but rather to keep in touch with experience, returning to it from time to time for fresh invigoration, direction and validation. In this way speculative interpretation (like hypothecation in science) may range wide and far, with fruitful results, without losing that common sharing of experience that makes the whole world kin.

¹ Hegel, who began with a deeply mystical experience.

REFLECTIONS OF A PERIPATETIC

VII.

By THE EDITOR

The Cricket in the Gourd

FOR the real understanding of a people one needs to reflect upon those common interests, practices and amusements which are certain to disclose their general philosophy of life. It is to be doubted whether there is in the wide world a more industrious or harder working people than the Chinese and yet they also have their leisure. It is these moments of delightful leisure to seek the things that interest them that reveal the inner working of their minds.

One pauses on a crowded street to pick up a gourd prepared to imprison a singing or fighting cricket. It was a considerable time making. Its surface bears beautifully and curiously embossed figures that were achieved by enclosing the growing gourd within a mold and compelling it to yield to the conformation of the matrix. The cover is a beautifully carved piece of wood.

Between us, the dealer and I strike a bargain for the gourd which he follows with an attempt to sell me a cricket. He removes the cover from a gourd and the locust concealed within its recesses begins immediately to scrape us a song, making no effort to escape.

The first reaction is that one who can get his pleasure from a singing cricket must be a simpleton, but a second thought classifies him as a philosopher. The capacity to take delight in simple and achievable joys is the mark of a man who has captured the secret of a happy and contented life. We of the Western world frequently go much farther to fare much worse. We waste life in a desperate yet futile

pursuit of pleasure, late hours over the stupid silences of the bridge table, wild motoring from place to place in the search for more interesting places, the exhaustion of social exactions which leave us with blurred impressions of multitudinous forms and faces and wasting chatter about nothing. Would it not be a far more sensible thing, in the quiet corner of our own fireside to introduce our cricket to the hearth and let him fiddle us his song? If the fullest life is marked by the fullest appreciation of simple joys, manifold correspondences with our encompassing world, the cricket in the gourd may represent a high and noble form of entertainment.

"Soul Chickens"

One does well in a foreign land to seek sedulously the explanation of any unusual or to him bizarre custom, for he is certain to find therein something of unusual interest. A brilliant Peiping morning witnessed a group of coolies bearing two oaken coffins blithely along, unattended by the usual pomp of a funeral. This in itself was occasion for remark quite apart from the chickens confined in wicker baskets on top of each. Inquiry showed that the men had started a long journey into a remote province for the ancestral home of the deceased. The imprisoned chickens attended the pilgrimage to call back the dead man's soul by crowing each morning, since there was always the possibility of its wandering away at the ghostly hour of dawn.

The Chinese feels himself a part of the locale in which he was born. As his life must be lived in strictest harmony with the will of heaven, it is the fitting thing that he should sink back into the landscape which he has loved, which brought him forth and which bore his ancestors. The harassed soul can find its peace only as it comes to rest

with its own. This is the final harmony, and accounts for the longing of our old-time Chinese friends to return home to die.

The symbolism of the cock as the herald of light, dawn, and resurrection, among all peoples would form an interesting diversion for research. It was a cock that recalled the wandering soul of the shifting Peter in the hall of the High Priest, and the cock adorns the steeple of many a New England church. His connection with the morning has made him everywhere a bird of portent and mystery. His heralding of dawn has given him special importance to the Chinese as to other peoples, for he seems in league and understanding with Nature herself, a prophet of her activities, a domestic seer. As during life he recalls the soul from slumber to wakefulness, so in death he is presumed to possess the same powers. He becomes the monitor and guide of the soul until it rests securely with its forefathers.

Jade Buddha

The only object we were not permitted to photograph in China was the Jade Buddha. It is a work of beauty and an object of reverence. Like Michael Angelo's *Last Judgment* in the Sistine Chapel, it seems to have been born of suffering and tragedy. It is said that the Emperor, incensed at the slowness and ineptness of his artists, finally sealed them in with a great block of jade, there to produce a worthy work or to perish. Thus was created this thing of beauty. It is no "laughing Buddha," taking lightly the suffering world, nor a "reclining Buddha," indifferent to the sadness of life. It has a depth and seriousness which only the tragic can produce. Thus it was that the mighty Angelo came down from the ceiling of the Sistine old and bent and blind, but he had wrought a picture that would survive the tests

of time and had committed his detractors to an eternity of infamy.

The deepest sarcasm on the present age is perhaps its incapacity for depth. Its pictures, its letters, its economics, and its politics are lacking in perspective. We cannot and we will not take the gaff of suffering. We would have the great rewards of life without struggle. We resent hardship. Nothing less than this can be the disease which leads our Western world into a wild search for easy panaceas, an unwillingness to pay the price of peace and justice. We still dream that the worth-while can be happened upon, or picked up upon the street, and we find ourselves continually at war with circumstance.

Unwelcome as the suggestion may be, there is naught but tragedy which is likely to restore the lost perspective to our civilization. We have a puerile fear of pain. Honesty is too difficult a word. Ease seems the most desirous of all possessions. Unless there is a change of motive the new civilization will of necessity be wrought out by less privileged but more enduring nations and races.

Such was the tale borne me by the *Jade Buddha* in his silent repose.

The Thief of Tsing Teh

That he was a thief I do not know—what his offence was is hidden from me, but he was a culprit just released from the village jail by the revolutionary bandits. Nevertheless, like the Thief on the Cross, he was a gentleman and a Christian, disclosing sudden qualities that were more illuminating than creed or circumstance and displaying, as the lightning discovers the landscape, a nobility which knew no time or place or race.

No event of recent years has so stirred the mind of the Chinese world as the decapitation of the Stamms and the rescue of their child by this Chinese martyr. To the rough bandits who could so ruthlessly take the lives of the unresisting missionary and his wife the babe seemed of no account. With the spirit of Pharisees they were showing the world their contempt for religion. They did not dream that the aftermath could hurt them. They met the remonstrance of the Thief of Tsing Teh against the slaughter of the child with the question of his willingness to suffer in her place. With such nobility of soul as is not often seen, he responded—his life for the child's.

We are too near this shocking event to catch more than dimly its significance. There is only the analogy of history. But these are the external signs which can be read, since there is nothing more merciless toward evil than the judgment of time. The stroke that took the Thief of Tsing Teh made forever impossible a future rule of the Communist bandits. By reason of it his story has been and will be on the lips of millions as long as history shall last. No testimony of ancient martyr-saint was ever more effective for the cause represented than the fortitude of these Christian missionaries will prove to be. In death they have won all that for which they lived. The Thief of Tsing Teh showed the capacity of his people for nobility which will shine as the stars forever and ever. It was an act that rises above provincial faiths and marks him greater than all. Whether he were Buddhist, Moslem, Confucian or Christian matters not. Here was religion pure and undefiled that outruns any bounds of creed or opinion. This tragic circumstance reveals the religious unity of all peoples.

CURRENT THOUGHT

Humanism and Humanism

When "Jesting" Pilate asked "What is Truth?" he went no deeper than the Hebrew psalmist who sang "What is Man that Thou art mindful of him?" Today there are many answers to the psalmist's question, but none so insistent as that which would reduce man to a clod, subject only to physical law, his ethics the "ethics of the dust",—to an insect spinning about him a machine world formed from the mechanisms of his body,—to a beast raised to a higher power by intelligence and turning the simple ferocity of the uncivilized jungle into the intensified brutality of civilization. Long before Watson, Shakespeare expressed this view of man:

Thou art not thyself;
For thou exist'st on many a thousand grains
That issue out of dust.

He also said

We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.

And though he does not tell us what dreams and sleep may be, little remains of man whether he be reduced to dust or dissolved in insubstantial air.

Against this view various humanisms have protested, each claiming substance and integrity for the creature into which are concentrated the diverse realms of experience. It is no accident that the two humanisms most prominent today have chosen for themselves the common term. For the humanism represented by Irving Babbitt, and that which finds outstanding expression in *The New Humanist*, have each concentrated on distinctly human aspects of existence. It is unfortunate, therefore, that, proceeding along too narrow lines, they have looked on one another as enemies.

In general humanists represented by Babbitt turn against the "practical" and "enlightened" modern man. To them he is characterized by a concern for the immediate, which he mistakes for the human; he deals with a momentary cross-section of life instead of with the whole, and confuses the issues of the hour with human destiny. If this is true, this kind of humanist is better termed a *modernist*. But since practical affairs are human, and since destiny for us is focussed in the here and now, we may perhaps best call him a *modern humanist*.

In contrast to this *humanist*, the men and movements sympathetic to Babbitt's humanism emphasize the past. For this they are often

called reactionaries, but their interest is not in the past as dead but as living. The past they say represents depth rather than clarity, wisdom rather than knowledge, experience rather than perception. They are therefore better termed traditionalists.

The difficulty behind the conflict between modern and traditional humanism is that each is apt on the one hand to deny the human character of the other's interest, and on the other to deny its own peculiar bias. Thus Cleanth Brooks in an article entitled "The Christianity of Modernism" in the February number of *The American Review*, while sincerely claiming to be progressive as well as conservative, attacks religious modernism on the grounds not only that it has capitulated to a merely scientific and practical point of view, but that its view is intrinsically non-human in a sense in which religion and poetry are human. He upholds this argument by distinguishing science and action as means, and poetry and religion as ends. Science, he says, is practical as well as abstract, and action is abstract as well as practical. They should not be abandoned, but they should be kept as servants of emotional, poetic and religious man.

The modernist's reply to the traditionalist is that he does value a living tradition. But the traditionalist rightly suspects that the modernist tends to select only those elements of the past which fit the modern mind,—that for him the past is a means not an end. But the modernist is right when he protests that science and action are not mere means, but part of life itself,—that the scientific spirit is no mere abstraction from human life but is intrinsic to it, that the lyric quality of intellect is as intense and beautiful as the more sensuous quality of art. Nor does he feel that the strife of social reform, even if it be for bread and butter, is merely a matter of the stomach, nor that the stomach is not a vital end in human living. This attitude is represented in Harold P. Marley's "Religion's Greatest Adventure" in the November-December number of *The New Humanist*. Whether he really feels the full flood of human nature, however, may be judged from the following selections from his hypothetical but apparently serious prayer to the deity, the names for whom "are all taken from contemporary literature:"

O Master Mathematician! We bow before the great fact of thy self-created universe. Midst the whirl of colossal spheres, O cosmic Drift, we would not have thee forget our infinitesimal planet.

Believing in the importance of man, in the geometric progress of society through the ages Thou Chief Imperative, we would not forget the personal equation—those intimate nuances for private living, which either add or subtract from character.

Do thou not despair, O Master, for thy creatures—of their coming to right solutions in the end and inheriting at last the spiritual riches which thou hast provided out of the wisdom of thy Super-Self.

H. Jeffery Smith.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

River of My Delight

Already the catkins on the willows sing a song of Spring and the northward-moving sun warns me that my little rushing river will begin to call. Did not my boon companion forget to say good morning yesterday, finding time only to remark, "It won't be long now"?

With the soul of a fisherman he tells me he knows a *new* place where they grow longer and stronger and more numerous than in the river of my delight. Under the circumstances one must evince interest, and by and by we shall attend him to the new place, catch a trout or two and be told that the stream was "alive with them last week."

But there is no stream with half the magic of the river of my delight. It is not the tangled banks of "bluettes," nor the gorgeous panoply of monkey-flowers, nor the tufts of pink phlox clinging to the upper crags, nor the impermeable masses of mountain lilac. These are but a small part of the charm of my little river, though one adds to them the stealthy approach of the red deer to the river-bank or the scuttling grey squirrels that play like kittens in the twilight, or the flashing wings of the grosbeak, or the tipsy motions of the water ousel. All these form a world of charm and beauty of which one feels so completely a part that all the doubts of God and goodness instilled by a morbid and rusty materialism are shed like a winter coat under the heat of summer.

More than all else as one trudges the forest aisles of this mountain stream is he conscious of an attending world of higher thoughts and interests. One steps immediately into the presence of other days and is surrounded by memories of the past. One smells the pungent odors of long-vanished camp-fires and listens for the halloo of voices around the bend, voices that were long-since stilled in the eternal silence. The vastness of the arch of sky seen through the trees is lighted by the pale delicacy of the evening star. My rod rests idly on the bank while the voices of nature speak through and in me in a language never to be forgotten and not to be misunderstood. Whether my creel be replete or empty is the least important of all facts as I wander by the River of My Delight.

R. T. F.

The American Catholic Philosophical Association

On October 25th and 26th the American Catholic Philosophical Association held a regional convention in San Francisco.

The general theme was "Scholastic Ethics and Modern Society". The relation between ethics on the one hand and economics, the state, education, the family, art, and religion on the other, were made the subjects of the several papers. Among the speakers were Father Kavanagh of Santa Clara, Fathers Blank and Baschab of the Dominican College at San Rafael, Professor Reinhardt of Stanford and Professor Hagerty of St. Mary's. A concluding address by Brother Leo, professor of literature at St. Mary's, used the old fairy tale to represent Lady Philosophy as the Sleeping Beauty and characterized the differences between the false philosophers who failed to gain entrance to the enchanted castle,—the self-seeking, the rationalists, and the antiquarians,—and the Prince Charming who succeeded.

The most obvious difference between these meetings and those of the American Philosophical Association was the missionary note which permeated the addresses. By this I do not mean that there was an emphasis on the Roman Catholic Church and its religion. But there was a zealous confidence in the truth and the value of the neo-scholastic philosophy, expressed in frequent positive statement, in occasional criticism of other contemporary philosophies and in repeated invitations to the catholic clergy, sisters, and laity of the audience to espouse philosophy and to support the association by membership. The purpose of the meetings seemed to be not so much to influence the non-catholic as to bring catholics themselves to an understanding of, and to an appreciation for the philosophy with which the history of their church is so intimately entangled.

The discussions of the papers were not up to the standards set by the papers themselves. Either out of politeness or timidity the critics were disposed to refrain from disagreement and to content themselves with remarks complimentary and complementary. After Lanz had responded to the call for discussion from the audience, however, the atmosphere changed. Although his comments were warmly welcomed, the others seemed to feel free to disagree with him in part. And having once disagreed with him they seemed more ready to differ from each other. In fact on the second day there was an animated discussion over Reinhardt's paper on aesthetics. The reason for this was said to be that Aquinas had not worked out his aesthetics as completely as the rest of his system. Hagerty

accused Reinhardt (good-naturedly of course) of being a Platonist rather than a scholastic, whereupon Kavanagh settled the dispute by asserting that in aesthetics Aquinas himself was something of a Platonist.

From the convention I came away feeling that I had been among friends. With me I brought also a deeper understanding of the attitude of catholics towards philosophy, of their respect and love for it, which I hope to be able to pass on more sympathetically than before to my students.

ELMO A. ROBINSON,
Associate professor, philosophy,
San Jose State College,
San Jose, California.

A Bowne Portrait Unveiled in Boston

As a tribute to the influence of Borden Parker Bowne, who occupied the chair of Philosophy from 1876 to 1910, a portrait done by Miss Mary Neal Richardson was presented to Boston University by friends and graduates last October. The unveiling exercises, held in Robinson Chapel, Boston University School of Theology, included addresses in honor of Bowne by Dean William M. Warren and Dean Albert C. Knudson, and an original poem on Bowne by Professor Earl Marlatt.

Dr. Burdette Brown on Social Security

In the field of social science rather than of philosophy Dr. Burdette Brown has written a very sane and moderate suggestion for meeting the demand for economic security. His suggestion embodies the care of children of indigent adults and aged people. The favorable part of the scheme is its apparent workability.

We presume those who are interested can secure copies of the pamphlet *Individual Economic Security of the Population* by addressing Dr. Burdette Boardman Brown at 2600 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California.

Philosophy Conferences at the University of Southern California

In connection with the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of Graduate Study at the University of Southern

California were held two conferences in philosophy which possess more than a local interest. The general celebration included conferences of all schools and departments of the University recognized as graduate units in the School of Graduate Research.

In the Philosophy panel the discussion on the first day, November 22nd, was led by Dr. Hartley Burr Alexander of Scripps College with Provost E. C. Moore of the University of California at Los Angeles, and Director Ralph Tyler Flewelling, of the School of Philosophy, University of Southern California as Leader.

Unlike Gaul, the theme of the opening day, *The Significance of the Teaching of Philosophy in Schools and Colleges*, was divided into two parts only. First Dr. Alexander raised the question as to what philosophy as studied in schools really is, and second as to what from questions and chance student comments he had found students to ask for from a study of philosophy. In attempting to give briefly the breadth and intimacy of Dr. Alexander's answers it is quite impossible and I am sure undesirable to refrain from using for the most part his actual sentences and phrases.

Philosophy, to begin with, is a *body of literature* marked by certain traits, as abstraction and concern for fundamentals, an inherent seriousness and dignity of thought, an international and intercultural intent and appeal. It is, moreover, an *order of thinking*, differing from so-called practical and matter-of-fact subjects as also from those concerned primarily with the plays of imagination, in that it is directed to the development of our essential humanity (as distinguished from animal traits). It aims to answer the question, What is it to be human? What is man at his best and truest?—and in answering this to give an account also of Man's Place in Nature, what man is in the world. This essentially is metaphysics.

Philosophy is also an *art of living*, with certain very definite gifts which are either not given or are less satisfactorily given by other studies. Among these may be named: (1) *Intellectual Liberation*,—liberation from the idols of political and social pressure, of religious and scientific prejudice and intolerance. In this sense philosophy is most of all important for the citizen of a democracy, from whom is demanded a freed power of judgment. (2) *Illuminated Understanding of Human Nature*. "Know thyself" is the prime maxim of philosophical thought. "The unexamined life is not worth living." But self-knowledge is for the sake of self-control and self-direction: this is the active side of the discipline. (3) *Moral development*. In asking what men are and what are their possibilities, philosophy opens the essential questions of what constitutes human

sanity and righteousness. "He who would duly inquire after the best form of the state ought first to determine which is the eligible life." This is the beginning of balanced living, and the end of its action is perhaps best indicated by "Vain is the discourse of that philosophy by which no human ill is eased." (4) *Spiritual Emancipation*. "It is for philosophy to point the way; for him who hath the eyes to see the vision."

Turning to the second question Dr. Alexander compares the spiritual bread which students seek from philosophy with the material and intellectual stones which they are too often given. What the student really asks for, he said, is the opening of new doors of thought, and, in a civilization characterized throughout by doubt and uncertainty, mental balance and poise. Finally, he seeks light on human destiny and meaning, especially in connection with religion. These things the study of the subject certainly yields, in the degree with which the student gives himself to the subject.

After the address the following members of the panel discussed the paper, those whose connections are not mentioned being members of the School of Philosophy of the University of Southern California: Dr. Theodore G. Soares, California Institute of Technology, Dr. Edwin D. Starbuck, Dr. B. A. G. Fuller, Dr. Edna A. Shearer, Smith College, Dr. Herbert L. Searles, Dr. W. H. Roberts, University of Redlands, Dr. Roy C. Bose, Chapman College, and Mrs. Geraldine Wildon Carr.

On the following day, November 23rd, Professor George P. Adams, of the University of California at Berkeley, presented a paper on "Science and the Organization of Life," Dr. Robert A. Millikan, Chairman of Board at the California Institute of Technology acting as chairman and entering into the discussion which Director Flewelling led. Once more in reporting the address we use freely the words of the speaker.

In answering the question, What does science contribute to civilization or culture? Dr. Adams distinguished a general reliance upon intelligence and reasonableness from the specific application of this principle in the field of the sciences. Science, he said, gives us technical control, but it is neutral concerning the ends which it serves. Thus in social and economic structure our scientific knowledge is adequate but we remain confused as to the ends and values they are to serve. Science yields power and control. It cannot prescribe ends and values for which power is sought. What we need chiefly is that which lies beyond science, namely a knowledge of the good.

The basic attitude and interest of science itself, however, must

not be confused with its practical results. For the scientific attitude is at cross-purposes with the vital concerns of life. Life requires finality, decision, the cutting off of possibilities, irrevocable action. Science is tentative, hypothetical, welcomes open possibilities and suspense of judgment. There is thus ground for the instinctive distrust that the practical man has for theory.

Again, the scientific interest runs counter to the basic attitudes of life in the ideals of impartiality, detachment, impersonality, disinterestedness, unprejudice. Vital interests, on the contrary, are partial, selective, interested, biased. The scientific attitude would disregard *my* world and discover *the* world, and in so doing would dissolve the bonds that tie man to the active and practical. It would make of him a spectator. From this, however, Professor Adams did not conclude that science has no value. For though the west has justified science largely by its utility, the subtle indirection of nature's processes suggests that we should refrain from interpreting too obviously and literally the utilitarian function of science. We have not begun to explore the possibilities of a civilization built on that spirit, rather than on the spirit of exploitation of man and nature.

In conclusion, Dr. Adams declared that science, philosophy and the universities that foster them are almost the final citadel of disinterestedness in our present civilization. If we are to avoid the utter surrender of reason and intelligence to alien forces, it will be because the principles and structure of our life, primarily those of our economic life, catch some reflection of the spirit of knowledge, the spirit of disinterestedness.

Taking part in the panel discussion were the following: Dr. John Elof Boodin, University of California at Los Angeles, Dr. Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Dr. Wilbur Long, Dr. Hugh Miller, University of California at Los Angeles, Dr. Donald C. Williams, University of California at Los Angeles, and Mr. H. Jeffery Smith.

Along the Bookshelf

God in the Universe

DIEU DANS L'UNIVERSE. Essai sur l'action exercée sur la pensée Chrétienne par les grands systèmes cosmologiques depuis Aristotèle jusqu'à nos jours. Par *Victor Monod*, Maître de Conférences à la Faculté de Théologie protestante. Université de Strasbourg. Libraire Fischbacher 33 rue de Seine, Paris. Pp. 356. Prix 35 francs.

It was an original and thrilling idea which led Victor Monod to examine the prevailing concepts of God from the standpoints of the dominant cosmological theories of the times in which they appeared. To Professor Monod the two are inseparable. The development of these theological and cosmological ideas is analyzed under three heads — the Aristotelian, the Newtonian, and, to be strictly up to date, the Relativistic. Professor Monod declares that the history of human thought shows that the notions of God and of the Universe are always modified correlatively and appear to be inextricably interwoven.

The Christian concept of God draws its power from the combination of two distinct ideas, the one of Hebraism and the other of Hellenism. The Hebrew God is ethical, historical and perceived in time. The God of the Greeks guarantees the intelligibility of the cosmic order and is perceived in space.

In the Aristotelian universe the future of the world is cyclic, having neither beginning nor end, and to two distinct types of movement belong two distinct substances. The world is finite

and unique. The Prime Mover is the Creator of movement, the world is hierarchic and permeable to reason, finite in space but infinite in time. Christianity raises the question whether creative power resides in matter or spirit, and this, being too great a problem for Aristotelianism to meet, prepares the way for new theological concepts.

These conform themselves to the Newtonian theories. Newton conceived the possibility of constructing a mechanical model of the universe. He affirmed that universal laws act in all celestial space, and that these were corrected from time to time by Divine intervention. The difficulty for Christianity in such a scheme is to account for any contact between such a God and his human creatures.

Into this situation the element of time has been injected by the doctrine of evolution. The cosmic order appears now as historical. Life is seen as the supreme cosmic effort and for the geocentrism of Aristotle we have substituted a biocentrism. Bergson in philosophy, Wallace in biology, and Jeans in cosmogony emphasize from their various fields the same outlook. Naturalism, on the other hand, confesses its embarrassment as to whether man occupies the first or last rank in the universe.

The work of Professor Monod reaches its climax in the third part, in discussing the relation of the new physics to theological

thought of today and tomorrow. The religious anti-scientists and the anti-religious scientists will not be broadly tolerant enough to understand for another generation or two the inevitable correlation of all truth in whatever realm. If the sins of the fathers are visited even to the third and fourth generations it may be yet a hundred years before the old bitternesses and prejudices have died out. But a new religious movement has begun, though the new religious concepts will not be satisfactory to the worshippers of the past. Neither will the new science be satisfactory to the bitter-enders in science, whose only yard-stick is matter and motion.

Relativity clears the way for a new reasonableness in religion. If Aristotle's universe presents us with a God who geometrizes, and Newton discovers a God who is primarily a celestial mathematician, Relativity brings back the geometrizing thought of Aristotle with this difference: the God of Relativity geometrizes in four or more dimensions. He is not the victim of his own laws and mechanism but works through all and in all. He is, moreover, not the creature of his own temporal and spatial order, but these are rather the human limitations of our sight and understanding. We need not place heaven or hell as "spots" in a space-time existence, immortality may be but the emergence of life into another dimension unrecognized by us now because of the limited spatial-temporal aspect from which we view our world. For most certain of all in the changing kaleidoscope of human experience, it is that the most enduring of experiences is that of the self. Here is the *one*

factor in *our* world that shows signs of eternity and so of immortality.

The author makes likewise a strong flank movement on the materialistic scientists by showing the relation of religion to a progressing and open-minded science. The fact remains that our most advanced scientists are openly religious, leaving materialism to be defended by reactionaries who maintain their own prejudiced position in contradiction to the scientific spirit which they profess. He cites Einstein's own confession of religion as the inspiration and aid to scientific investigation.

Professor Monod's work should be translated into English and widely circulated. It would help to bring new understandings among our most advanced thinkers in both scientific and religious fields and constitutes a powerful and distinctly new argument for the reality of God, Freedom and Immortality.

R. T. F.

James and Peirce

THE THOUGHT AND CHARACTER OF WILLIAM JAMES, as revealed in unpublished correspondence and notes, together with his published writings. By Ralph Barton Perry. Vol. I. Inheritance and Vocation, Pp. vii, 826. Vol. II. Philosophy and Psychology. Pp. xxiii, 786. Little, Brown and Company, Boston. 1935. \$12.00.

COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE. Edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Vol. VI. Scientific Metaphysics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1935. Pp. x, 462. \$5.00.

Professor Perry is to be cordially congratulated on the appearance of his long-awaited edition of the further Letters of Wil-

liam James. These two stately volumes contain, the Preface tells us, 500 unpublished letters of James himself, over 50 of his father, 30 of his brother Henry, 17 unpublished letters of Emerson, and selections from the immense correspondence which James carried on with most of the philosophic celebrities of his time. The whole is divided into 91 chapters and 12 appendices and classified under six parts. Of these the first is devoted to James's father and his family, the second to his Education and Career, the third to his Early Philosophical Orientation, the fourth to Psychology, the fifth to Ethics and Religion, and the sixth to the Ultimate Philosophical System; and each is illustrated by appropriate selections from his correspondence. These alone would suffice to assure the literary success of the work, while when one takes into account the *verve* and candor of James's letter-writing one is irresistibly prompted to cry out, "Surely never before have we been taken so fully into the confidence of a great philosophic mind and enabled to follow its workings so minutely! What would we not give to have a tithe of such authentic, personal information about other great figures in the history of thought, about Pythagoras, Parmenides, Protagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant and the rest! Professor Perry has presented us with the definitive and final study of James, and no limits can be set to our gratitude."

Such is the overwhelming impression Professor Perry's book makes at a first reading, and no subsequent reflection is likely to

modify the conviction that it forms an invaluable addition to American philosophic literature. Its industry is beyond all praise, and its accuracy well-nigh impeccable. It has provided for all time a source-book indispensable to all students of William James and of American philosophy, and in due course a multitude of Ph.D. theses will unquestionably be written out of it.

Nevertheless I do not feel so sure that Professor Perry has said the last word about William James. For I do not feel sure that he has made the right selections and so distributed his lights and shades and emphases as to produce a portrait which is a good likeness. It looks a little like an unconscious confession of a failure to achieve a final synthesis of James's personality that in his concluding chapter he is impelled to recognize no less than four William Jameses; viz., "the neurasthenic James, with his unstable nervous equilibrium, his sometimes morbidly vivid and lawless imagination, his oscillation of mood and aversion to rigorous intellectual procedure; and the radiant James, vivid, gay, loving, companionable and sensitive" (II. p. 699). There was also, according to Professor Perry, "a third James, in whom the second of these is deepened and enriched through being united with the first" (*ibid.*), and a fourth, "the James of experience and discipline" who "was also a man of the world," and "despite his bold indiscretions, his easy manners, and a mischievous delight in shocking the pedants . . . never strayed beyond the bounds of good taste . . . and never *did* make a fool of himself" (II. p. 701). One feels that Professor

Perry might have saved himself pages of painstaking analysis by saying simply, what he nowhere quite admits, "in short, James, with all his idiosyncrasies, was unquestionably a genius." Instead of this, many of his remarks may be read as though he thought James was rather lucky not to end up in a lunatic asylum.

Now this cannot, of course, have been his meaning. He is a competent and admiring biographer, though he has his prejudices and is in imperfect sympathy with several aspects of James's nature which the latter was not afraid to display. So he cannot altogether repress a suspicion that a man who exhibits so many varieties of personality cannot, academically at least, be looked upon as wholly safe and sound. But this suspicion need not mean more than a failure to penetrate to the central core from which James's multiple personalities could be seen to spring, and this again, perhaps, betokens merely a defect of sympathy.

Of such defect it seems possible to trace a number of manifestations. Thus he pretty plainly does not approve of James's style, with its unprofessorial unconventionality. Nor, again, of James's detestation of academic pedantry and "mere cads or university blackguards" (II. p. 20), and his contempt for "the Ph.D. octopus." Also he conceives the relations of logic and psychology to philosophy very differently from James. James was fond of expressing his contempt for the futilities of formal logic and the preposterous claims of intellectualists that theirs was the only logic, without taking the trouble

to confute them in detail: in Professor Perry's interpretation these *boutades* are interpreted as "a pathological repugnance to the processes of exact thought" (II. p. 680). It does not seem to me at all likely, in view of the hopeless divergences of opinion among the different brands of logicians and mathematicians, that James's respect for "the processes of exact thought" would be any greater now than it was a generation ago. The case of psychology is not so very different. The discrepant schools of psychology have grown more numerous and more technical, but neither more fruitful nor more scientific, if "science" is taken to imply prediction and control. And although James's example in bridging over the gulf between psychology and philosophy has not been extensively followed either by philosophers or by psychologists, it would probably have been better for both if it had been. At any rate, I cannot endorse Professor Perry's condemnation of James, that "he undertook to be a rigorously scientific psychologist, and yet he exceeded all the psychologists of modern times in the frequency of his metaphysical infidelities," until "the line between psychology and philosophy . . . was totally obliterated" (II. p. 668). This only shows that Professor Perry has not realized that the obliteration of any hard-and-fast line between psychology and philosophy was precisely one of James's chief aims, and one of the chief consequences of his pragmatism. In token whereof may be adduced the fact that all the essential doctrines of James's pragmatism were already plainly enunciated in his *Psychology*. This was proved up to the hilt in H. V.

Knox's *Philosophy of William James* (1914), an excellent little book, which is barely mentioned (II. p. 508).

In general, Professor Perry seems disposed to minimize both the originality and the importance of James's pragmatism, and to make little serious effort to place it in its historical context with respect either to its opponents or to its supporters. He does indeed quote copiously from James's letters his unwearied attempts to win over his friends by concessions (mainly verbal) to their prejudices; but the points at issue do not often stand out clearly, and the novelties of pragmatism seem to have functioned chiefly as a sort of intelligence test for aged philosophers who had made up their minds long ago, and were unable to readjust themselves.

Hence the book does not provide as much novelty, philosophically, as might have been expected. It throws a certain amount of fresh light on the relations between James and Peirce, though even that had been anticipated by the recent publication of the latter's *Works*. Vol. V. It had, of course, always been known that Peirce could not reconcile himself to the use to which James and his followers put the so-called "principle of Peirce," and this is fully confirmed in II. p. 430. Many had suspected also that Peirce was at bottom a crank, though no doubt the greatest of those James delighted to pet: this also is confirmed (II. p. 375) by his saying, "He is a hopeless crank and failure in many ways, but a really extraordinary intellect. I never knew a mind of so many different

kinds of spotty intensity or vigor." He bore Peirce's querulous lecturing angelically, and made desperate attempts to get him appointed at Harvard (II. 416, 117). I cannot, however, make out how Professor Perry finally conceives the relation between the two founders of modern Pragmatism. He tells us (II. p. 407) "it is clear that the idea that pragmatism originated with Peirce was originated by James" and a little later (II. p. 409) that "the modern movement known as pragmatism is largely the result of James's misunderstanding of Peirce." I venture to suggest that James, supreme psychologist that he was, understood what was valuable in Peirce better than Peirce himself, and treated him both generously and discriminatingly. As so often, James looked about for a peg on which to hang his own doctrine, lest its claim to originality should affront the unsleeping jealousy and vanity of the learned, and picked up Peirce, thinking doubtless that this would please and help him. But Peirce had for twenty years pretty completely submerged his mind in symbolic logic; so he repudiated the proffered honor, and differentiated his own doctrine as "pragmatism." Yet for all his "exact" thinking, he was never able to define it! At any rate, as Peirce's authentic views were inaccessible for years after James had started the pragmatic movement, it is pretty clear that Peirce can not have been more than its putative parent.

For obvious reasons Professor Perry does not tell the whole story of James's relations with his philosophic colleagues at Harvard, but I can not forbear to

refer to his confidential letter to Royce, when he was securing Muensterberg's appointment (II. pp. 140, 141). It sizes up Muensterberg beautifully and very fairly, but reads rather oddly by the side of the enthusiastic letters he was simultaneously writing to Muensterberg himself. Of course the proper inference is that James's enthusiasm, whether for a person or a cause, was in no way incompatible with sound judgment and critical acumen.

Finally, there are very few misprints in the book, and these mostly in foreign quotations, like "flare" for *flair* (I. p. 126) and "Gobblob" for *Gottlob* (II. p. 218). The index is elaborate, though not exhaustive, to judge by a little mechanical test I tried upon it. I found that out of 41 references to myself, it had listed only 18. The printing and general get-up are worthy of its subject and of Harvard.

Messrs. Hartshorne and Weiss are heroically persevering in the proverbially impossible task of putting Humpty Dumpty together again, and it is beginning to look as though they might be almost as successful with Peirce as Isis was with the *membra disjecta* of Osiris. To the compilation of the present volume of *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* there have gone no less than forty-three distinct fragments of Peirce, sometimes taken out of their contexts in other courses of lectures, and ranging in date from 1868 to 1911. In the eyes of the editors (as possibly in those of Peirce) the subjects may all be considered as metaphysical in a large and loose sense, but it is by no means easy to determine what they mean by the blanket

title "scientific metaphysics." Is its implication that it contains the metaphysical musings and excursions of one who prided himself on being a scientist, or that it expounds metaphysics which can claim to be scientific? In the latter case how did Peirce (or his editors) conceive the relations of metaphysics to the sciences? Even this last question is anything but easy to answer. We find indeed several dicta which might be taken (or mistaken) for definitions of metaphysics, such as (p. 1) that it is "a highly abstract science . . . in a deplorably backward condition" which "has always been the ape of mathematics" (p. 25), and that it "is the proper designation for the third and completing department of coenoscropy," whose "business it is to study the most general features of reality and real objects" (p. 5), though at present "a puny, rickety, and scrofulous science" (*ibid.*). So we are told (p. 147) that "metaphysics has to account for the whole universe of being," and (p. 258) that "in the sphere of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics . . . all that exists is of necessity;" and finally (p. 338), that it "cannot adapt the human race to maintain itself" and so, presumably, has no pragmatic value. Yet we are also assured that "even bad metaphysics really rests on observations" (p. 2, also p. 5).

Thus Peirce's conceptions of metaphysics seem to be pretty vague and almost contradictory; for if the data of metaphysics are matters of observation, how can it be an abstract and necessary science? At any rate they hardly make adequate provision for any co-operation of metaphysics and the sciences. Indeed, the idea that

the function of metaphysics is to accept, interpret, and harmonize the results of the special sciences seems to be excluded.

Under these circumstances the reader must not expect to find a system of metaphysics in Peirce. Even if his editors had succeeded in completely putting Humpty Dumpty together again, it would remain questionable whether the result was worth doing, and whether it was authentically Peirce. For though there is, I suppose, always a certain amount of psychological continuity in the writings of any author, it is usually accompanied by a good deal of logical incoherence. Philosophers are no exception to this rule, though not many of them have been more unsystematic than Peirce in their mode of self-expression, and less capable of concise, sharp, and lucid definition of their beliefs.

His *forte* lies in his *aperçus*, and of such there are many deserving of quotation also in the present volume. It does not indeed add anything substantial to the revelations of Vol. V. about the origins of pragmatism, nor is it more successful in making clear the *differentia* of pragmatism. Indeed, on pp. 331, 332 Peirce has no little difficulty in distinguishing the pragmaticists' conception of the satisfactoriness of truth from the pragmatists', a difficulty which had already appeared in Vol. V, and been remarked on by me in the *Personalist* for Spring 1935, p. 170. The remarks on Pp. 128-131 on William James, ending with the confession that "he was even greater in the practice than in the theory of psychology," should also be

read, and compared with James's appraisal of Peirce (in a letter to me) in Vol. II of Professor Perry's monumental book on James (p. 375). James said, "He is a hopeless crank and failure in many ways, but a really extraordinary intellect. I never knew a mind of so many different kinds of spotty intensity or vigor." Evidently then Peirce was a crank *de première cuvée*.

Now in my own dealings with cranks I have found that perhaps the most reliable mark of the *genus* crank is a constitutional inability to give a straight answer to a straightforward question. The crank will always stray from the point into some favorite hobby of his own. Judged by this test, James's judgment is amply justified in this volume. Peirce can hardly ever get away from his mathematics and his "logic" and their alleged "exactness." But for all that we may take to heart the dictum (p. 174) that "the idealist has no need to dread a mechanical theory of life. On the contrary, such a theory, fully developed, is bound to call in a tychistic idealism as its indispensable adjunct," and may be grateful for the section on the much-neglected topic of personality on p. 110, even though pp. 175-177 take much of this back and reduce personality to "only a particular kind of general idea." Lastly, the dictum (p. 74) that "Aristotle was by many lengths the greatest intellect that human history has to show" plainly declares the bent of Peirce's soul. Is it not tragic that so professorial a mind should never have been summoned to adorn a professorship?

F. C. S. Schiller.

Philosophical Horizons

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY AND TOMORROW. Edited by *Horace M. Kallen* and *Sidney Hook*. Lee Furman, Inc., New York. 1935. Pp. viii, 518. \$3.75.

THE HORIZONS OF THOUGHT. By *George Perrigo Conger*. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 1933. Pp. x, 367. \$5.00.

KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF AND OPINION. By *John Laird*. The Century Company, New York. 1935. Pp. xi, 515.

A STUDY IN SYNTHESIS. By *James H. Cousins*. Ganesh and Company, Madras. 1934. Pp. 503. \$2.00.

When I opened this book it vividly reminded me of the four-and-twenty blackbirds baked in a pie who began to sing so soon as the pie was opened. But of course there are differences. In the first place, it contains "the views of twenty-five representative American thinkers," not of four and twenty blackbirds, or even mocking-birds. Secondly, their concert is not a concerted one, but "each has written down his own heart and mind, without any meeting with his fellow-contributors, without consultation, without discussion." Thirdly, the editors leave it to their readers to determine what the upshot is: they may decide that "no common view emerges," or that groups and sects segregate themselves, or that a certain consensus about the methods and principles of philosophy may be discerned.

To me it seems very remarkable that twenty-five philosophers (to wit, in alphabetical order, as printed, Messrs. M. J. Aronson, C. E. Ayres, E. S. Bates, B. H. Bode, F. S. Cohen, H. T. Costello, Will Durant, I. Edman, R. T. Flewelling, E. B. Holt, S. Hook, J. A. Irving, H. M. Kallen, K. Koffka, A. Locke, A. E. Mor-

gan, A. E. Murphy, E. Nagel, H. A. Overstreet, J. H. Randall, H. W. Schneider, W. H. Sheldon, T. V. Smith, P. Weiss and M. Williams) should have been found willing to combine in a single chorus of autobiography, in a sort of continuation of the *Contemporary American Philosophy*, in which "the elder statesmen" voiced their "pre-depression philosophy," and even more remarkable that an American publisher should have had the courage to bring out this work. For it plainly seems to indicate not only that adverse circumstances have not utterly silenced the voice of philosophy but that the depression is at last lifting and that the reading public is no longer paralysed by solicitude about its daily bread.

As is usual in such cases, the various essays differ considerably in interest and importance, and where there are so many to choose from it is not unlikely that to so rich a *ragoût* the maxim may apply *il y en a pour tous les goûts, même pour le dégoût*. Speaking subjectively, I may confess that I have found most interest and entertainment, and derived most nutriment from the essays of Messrs. Aronson, Bode, Holt, Kallen, Morgan (the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, as representing the philosophizing of a practical man), Overstreet, and, of course, our own Editor. I do not think Professor Flewelling has ever expounded the philosophic implications of the Principles of Relativity and Uncertainty, nor exposed the follies and failures in the naturalistic interpretation of Science, more clearly and forcibly. As he says (p. 167), "there are far more convincing reasons to

conclude from the presence of intelligence and contingency in our own personal systems to their presence in the macrocosm than to guess the orbital character of the atom from that of the solar and other systems." "Every attempt at explanation . . . has anthropomorphism woven into both warp and woof of its texture," and personalist philosophers may well chuckle over the breakdown of the traditional abstraction from personality supposed to inhere in scientific method. Politically, a good many of Dr. Kallen's flock of "blackbirds" would appear to be of the *red-winged* variety; this is sufficiently explained by their writing in an era of depression, and their authors are quite young enough to outgrow their radicalism; but on the whole Messrs. Kallen and Hook have deserved well of the Republic of Letters by concocting so palatable a *casserole*.

Professor Laird, being the master of a lucid and pleasing literary style, which all his philosophic colleagues should emulate and most should envy, has written a thoroughly readable and charming book entitled *Knowledge, Opinion and Belief* on some of the most difficult, abstruse and controversial subjects of philosophic debate. In all its five hundred and odd pages there is hardly a dull one. And yet, when the fascinated reader stops at its (somewhat abrupt) close to ask himself what precisely he has learned about the relations of knowledge, belief, opinion and faith, he may find it difficult to say anything definite. He has been entertained with a series of agreeable *causeries* on these topics, with a number of neatly-phrased comments on historical

philosophies, with a generous recognition of ambiguities and conflicting points of view. But he has *not* encountered any clear-cut definitions, nor proofs that knowledge, belief and opinion, in the senses (on the whole) favored by Professor Laird, actually exist. Nor has he encountered any systematic discussion of the relations between logic and psychology, such as would seem to be urgently demanded by the decidedly border-line subjects Professor Laird has selected for treatment. Yet "belief" and "opinion" manifestly admit of infinite gradations in intensity and value, while "knowledge" is applied very widely to any process which is thought to improve the cognitive value of a human belief as well as to the unapproachable ideal of an infallibility which not even popes and professors can attain.

Perhaps the truth is that Professor Laird is content to play about the surface of his subjects and does not care to penetrate into their depths. By predilection he would seem to be a historian of philosophy and a conservative. So it is natural for him to arrive at the conclusion (p. 499): "it is neither prudent nor possible to abandon the traditional questions that have been raised for so many centuries concerning faith and knowledge." A more radical temper would, of course, have drawn from the same *data* the more adventurous conclusion that it was high time that academic philosophy proceeded to consider some of the newer and more promising methods for dealing with these stale old problems!

In illustration of these strictures, I will here refer only to

Professor Laird's defence of formal logic, and particularly of the "laws of thought" and the syllogism. Although he duly refers to the Law of Excluded Middle of Dr. Tennant's famous printer, he never raises the crucial question of what (if anything) these "laws" really mean. Similarly his defence of the syllogism against the charge of *petitio principii* (p.227f.) is merely to state that *all men are mortal* does not mean an exhaustive enumeration of particular cases. We are left to conjecture what, then, a syllogistic major premiss does mean, and whether any of the alternative meanings are less open to the charge of *petitio principii*. As this example shows, in Professor Laird's eyes J. S. Mill, though "refuted" countless times, is still the only enemy academic logic consents to recognize. He is still the whipping boy who never grows out of date in the eyes of a logic, that never grows up; presumably because he is the only critic to whom some sort of answer has been found. Otherwise the deadly attack on the syllogism's validity implicit in Alfred Sidgwick's proof of the incurable liability of its middle term to ambiguity, would surely have received mention a generation or so ago. But, alas, unanswerable objections to a tradition never are answered: the only safe course is to pass them over in silence!

F. C. S. S.

The Horizons of Thought is a companion volume to the author's *A World of Epitomizations*, which appeared in 1931. The earlier book is a study in metaphysics and is foundational to the present work, since episte-

mology is regarded as but a chapter in metaphysics. The hypothesis there developed is that the universe is a system of systems which have resemblances called "epitomizations." The various levels are the logical, the numerical, the geometrical-kinematic, the cosmogonic (or physical world), the biological, and the neuropsychological. The first three are regarded as subsistent, the latter three as existent. The relationship between them is that of "container and contained," with mind represented by an inner circle and belonging within the highest and most coordinated of the six realms, each later realm epitomizing the prior realms.

The present book is a study of some of the processes of our minds in the universe when both mind and universe are described according to the hypothesis of epitomization. Because the mind is in the inner realm it apprehends the data of outer realms only as these data are refracted through the intermediate realms. Any of the patterns in any of the realms are called monads. Several types of dualities occur in the characteristics of these monads at all levels, some of which are implicit and some explicit. It is the implicit dualities which are discerned in the patterns involved in thinking and are the principal objects of study.

In both perception and thinking nine dualities are selected for analysis, the most notable being that of selection and correlative neglect, since it reveals most clearly the limitations or "horizons" of thought. When selection takes place, what has

been selected is treated as in the traditional logic under "denotation" and "connotation." What is unique to the point of view here presented is the treatment of the neglected areas. This is treated under the terms "enotation" and "innotation." Enotation means a reference to a background of our thinking beyond the connotative and denotative fields. Innotation means a reference to that which is within the connotative field but which must necessarily be neglected because we do not and cannot make all possible statements about it. The invention of these new terms is an extension and elaboration of the author's view presented in Appendix A in *A Course in Philosophy*, published in 1924, where the neglected area was regarded as merely denotative.

The nine dualities selected for discussion are involved in the major problems, categories, and concepts of philosophy. In logic: identity and difference, negatives, contradictories, inductions, generalizations and universals, etc. In mathematics: continuity, limits and infinities. In ontology: beginnings and endings, order and disorder, being, non-being, and becoming, etc. In cosmology: space-time and the physical universe. In psychology: freedom, value, and intuition.

These concepts are analyzed in detail in the light of the writings of numerous authorities in each field, and their views considered as illustrating the many mistaken attempts to treat neglected backgrounds, that is, enotative and innotative realms, which are beyond the horizons of our thinking, as if they were parts of the denotative and connotative con-

tent. It is the contention of the author that much confusion and error have resulted from the failure of philosophers to recognize these horizons.

The reviewer is heartily in accord with the author's gentle if erudite rebuke of the metaphysicians and logicians who have become over-dogmatic in proclaiming as absolute truth that which is beyond their capacities and knowledge. He would heartily subscribe to the saying that much "philosophy is the systematic misuse of a terminology devised for the same purpose." However, a careful study of this book leaves a number of questions. In what respect is the relativism which results essentially different from that of the Greek Skeptics? How can the enotative and the innotative be brought into the realm of the denotative and connotative? It would seem, according to the author's position, that this occurs through science, logic, and intuitional appreciation. But what is to prevent the same demand for suspension of judgment and a non-committal attitude in these realms? It would seem that the terms "denotation" and "connotation" themselves need further analysis; for more fundamental than these are the concepts of meaning and error. We grant that the only way in which knowledge can advance is by the denotative and connotative eating into the enotative and innotative; but it would seem that the speculative scanning beyond the horizon by the metaphysician and the postulational and imaginative hypothesizing before final selection by the scientist, are but cases of

necessary, if often mistaken, sal-
lies into the forbidden country.

The Horizons of Thought is an important book which deserves and will receive consideration, in spite of a somewhat forbidding appearance and technical vocabulary. While presenting a frankly admitted relativistic epistemology, it is a solid and significant contribution to that tradition begun by John Locke in order to "see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with."

It is perhaps a doubtful compliment to a poet to say that he has the mind of a philosopher. However, in this excellent book, *A Study in Synthesis*, the role of the poet has not been entirely submerged in that of the philosopher and educator. It is the fruit of many years of study, writing, and teaching in the fields of poetry, literature, philosophy, education, and interracial relationships.

The author's thesis is that personality is a unity and that when the octave of human capacity, namely, Intuition, Emotion, Cognition and Action is recognized in both its subjective and objective phases, and each part adequately developed, a synthesis will result in religion, the arts, philosophy, science, social organization and educational theory.

The author borrows a phrase from William James's introductory lecture in Pragmatism — "the total push and pressure of the Cosmos"—to express his sense of a "cosmic totality" as the basis of synthetical thought. It should be said, however, that the application which is made of this conception by the author is quite foreign to the total view

of James, who spent his whole lifetime in showing the weaknesses of a monistic metaphysics.

The work shows an excellent grasp of both Oriental and Occidental thought and reveals a deep love for the philosophy and culture of India, together with a critical appreciation and understanding of the major thought currents of Europe and America. The educational synthesis is reminiscent of the Aristotelian view that happiness is achieved by the best development of our powers. Modern education must have as its aim a balanced development of all capacities, including the aspirational and creative.

In the chapter on the associative synthesis, strong protests are entered against social and political stupidities in different parts of the world. The criticism seems in some cases to be carried to an extreme and the reader is inclined to protest when suddenly he is informed that it is a counsel of perfection that is being offered. No new social panaceas are suggested, however, such as abound in the social emphasis in western philosophers today, but confidence is placed in the education of the child as a feeler, thinker, and doer.

If the reviewer were to offer a criticism, it would be purely from the viewpoint of a different presupposition. It would in no way refute the view here presented but merely serve to point out an essential difference between customary modes of thought in east and west. Dr. Cousins thinks naturally in terms of "intuitions," "wholes,"

and "cosmic totalities." The western mind tends to be somewhat skeptical of absolutes. Yet while one may find great aesthetic satisfaction in a view involving "cosmic totality" it must be admitted that it is rationally unknowable and as such must be held as a metaphysical postulate or an aesthetic experience.

We might wish that our author had been more specific and given us some evidence in support of his firm conviction of the truth of the findings of psychic research. In a field where so much uncertainty and skepticism prevail assent cannot be expected without weighty and authoritative supporting evidence.

H. L. Searles.

Plato: Debunked, Translated and Explained!

THE PLATONIC LEGEND. By *Warner Fite*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1934. Pp. ix, 331.

PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. *The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato*, translated with a running commentary. By *Francis MacDonald Cornford*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, and Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner and Company, London. 1935. Pp. xiv, 336. \$4.50.

Warner Fite's *The Platonic Legend* is an uproarious attack not only upon the Nineteenth Century platonic scholars but upon Plato himself. It is not a balanced appraisal of Plato and does not pretend to be. Instead it concentrates on certain aspects of his ethical and social theory and practice, and on their implications for his philosophy as a whole.

For the reader whose reverence for Classical tradition is

not so solemn as to drown his sense of humor, this bold adventure will prove first rate philosophical entertainment—a rare treat in a wordy world. It is much more than this, however. If it lacks the systematic heaviness (or weight) of linked learning long drawn out, its rapier thrusts are keen and frequently draw blood. Fite wins on points, though doubtless there are points which his critics can score against him. But the important feature of the book is not its sudden and effective sallies, its turns and twists, nor even the devastating laughter which runs through every page. Rather, its importance rests on the fact that it offers a fundamental philosophical critique of Plato and his interpreters from the standpoint of a vital philosophical alternative. It is an attack on formalism from the standpoint of personalism or personal idealism. Not that the author enters upon an epistemological and metaphysical discussion of the merits of these alternatives. For his primary aim is to clarify the issues. Hence his attack upon the platonic scholars, whom he charges with a systematic if unconscious misrepresentation of Plato along certain lines.

It is no doubt pretentious for an amateur in the field of platonic scholarship to make so general an attack on the work of men whose learning and integrity cannot be questioned. A word of explanation, therefore, may be in order. Practically all of the scholars whom Fite attacks are men whose training lay in the Victorian period. Thus Fite's book may be construed in large measure as an attack on the Victorian Bowdlerization of

Plato's cold, aristocratic ethical and political attitudes. Fite respects Jowett's commentaries, but he is sharp in criticism of his translations, which hint at humanitarian sentiments which Plato did not have, as, for instance in the use of "guardian" instead of "guard." He deals effectively with the attempt to discover in the *Republic* "a liberal and democratic Plato," and points to Sparta as the model which was in the back of Plato's anti-democratic mind.

The reviewer's guess is that Fite began this book as an attack on the Platonic critics, but that gradually his attention turned to Plato himself. At any rate, without questioning Plato's philosophical greatness, Fite pictures him as a sardonic aristocrat, dominated by a mathematical mind, as a philosopher who emphasized the reality of forms, rather than an idealist who believed very fundamentally in living mind. But most of all he emphasizes his lack not only of sympathy for the common man, but of interest in personality altogether. Thus his artistry is described as formal, his humor as supercilious rather than vital, his human relations as psychologically perverted.

One of the surest signs of the Victorian mind is the effort to overlook what is thought to be improper. This applies to the critics' attitudes toward Plato's compromising treatment of homosexuality. On the whole the critics have held that Plato's attitude was in keeping with the times, and that though it cannot be approved of it must not be construed as having an important bearing on either Plato or

his philosophy as a whole. Fite, on the contrary, in keeping with the present day, is particularly sex-conscious, and though he does not oppose homosexuality as a form of psychological or physical unbalance, he makes it clear that it had something to do with Plato's attitude towards women and inelegant men. Fite's treatment of the last scene in the *Phaedo* is devastating and unforgettable.

In these days when dictatorship and bureaucracy are threatening on every hand, the general reader, used to reference to Plato in works of every type, eugenical, political, educational and sociological, will find this book of vital interest. For Fite attempts to show that the social ethics of Plato idealized an aristocratically governed, police controlled society, in which order and proportion, not freedom and self-realization, were the high ideals.

H. Jeffery Smith.

The title of F. M. Cornford's *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, as its author confesses, is somewhat misleading. It is not a complete treatise on Plato's epistemology, but only a scholarly translation of two (important) dialogues, together with a (mainly) philosophic commentary and philological Notes. The philosophic reader is, however, left in some doubt how, and how far, the author understands the Platonic problem as a whole. It would seem that his attitude towards Platonic exegesis was in the main conservative: he rejects the theories of Burnet and Taylor, ignores the earlier ones of Henry Jackson, and (without

solving the *crux* of the *Parmenides*) tries to maintain the traditional version of the Ideal theory. Taking the *Theaetetus* closely with the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*, he believes that Plato had intended to gather up all the loose threads in a dialogue on the Philosopher, which never got written. This theory implies that the solution of the problem of error or false judgment, which the *Theaetetus* leaves unsolved, is to be found in the *Sophist*. Professor Cornford thinks it is so to be found, on page 264, B-D. False judgment is not about nothing, but is due to applying to an object a Form *other than* the right one (pp. 316, 317). But this hardly explains why in errors wrong Forms should be selected, nor why there should exist the peculiar sort of "otherness" which is error.

In his preface Professor Cornford excuses himself for ignoring interpretations which he "cannot accept." This, however, hardly seems a sufficient excuse for his neglect to explore the very relevant and instructive affinities of Protagoreanism with modern pragmatism. And, at any rate, the dogmatic footnote on page 73, "Protagoras' position should not be confused with modern pragmatism, which does not assert that all beliefs must be equally true," is so inadequate as to be worse than nothing at all.

F. C. S. S.

Social Philosophy and History

PARETO'S GENERAL SOCIOLOGY. A Physiologist's Interpretation. By *Lawrence J. Henderson*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1935. Pp. vii, 119. \$1.25.

ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS. By *Felix S. Cohen*. Falcon Press, New York. 1933. Pp. xi, 303. \$3.75.

CONDORCET AND THE RISE OF LIBERALISM IN FRANCE. By *J. Salwyn Schapiro*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. 1934. Pp. 277. \$3.50.

AT WAR WITH ACADEMIC TRADITIONS IN AMERICA. By *A. Lawrence Lowell*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1934. Pp. xiv, 357. \$4.00.

For those who have been attracted to the great reputation of Pareto's social philosophy and who have not the courage to attack the ponderous tomes of the original *Treatise on General Sociology* this brief summary will be most welcome. Pareto's discovery has been that the statistics of social science are deceptive as to the facts, since the facts are more personal than mathematical. Aware of the misleading conclusions that arise from the over-emphasis of social mathematics, he attempts to work out a new system of symbols. Under mathematical forms he endeavors to include social sentiments which he classifies as "residues" and "derivatives." Thus by a new terminology he hopes to escape the old formalisms.

He is not, however, rid of the difficulty, since no human sentiments, social prejudices, complexes, or other factors dependent on free human wills are ever constant. The results obtained by washing out their differences in common definition can be nothing better than loose approximation and may very well be misleading because of overlooked individual factors which the mathematical symbols do not include. At its weakest the system is not applicable to any

given specific occasion but gives results only generally true of a large number of cases.

But Pareto's eyes have been turned in the right direction, namely, to the weaknesses of the older method in social science. His work may well mark the beginning of a new day in social research.

R. T. F.

It is a very encouraging sign when lawyers become versed in philosophy adequately to criticize their own profession and the institution of law which so easily becomes crystalized and formal. *Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals* by Felix Cohen is, in a word, an affirmation of the proposition that "the law was made for man and not man for the law." It holds that legal criticism is dependent upon the ethical concept of the good life. Various standards of legal criticism such as justice, liberty, security, etc., are subjected to criticism and their limitations revealed. The question which has exercised students of ethics since the rise of the evolutionary and empirical sciences as to how far the data of science should offset the rationalistic view, which insists that no amount of attention paid to how people act will affect the question as to what is the good life, has been well handled. The solution here offered is a compromise. The science of ethics retains its theoretical right to define the good, but at the same time the incorporation of the materials of science is advocated as a help in determining the consequences of conduct. It is held that ethics can be made scientific without becoming, as it does with the anthropologists like

Levy-Bruhl, a mere "*science des mœurs*." What the author means by a science of ethics is explained as "(1) Logical explication and systematic development of possible hypotheses. (2) The testing of these hypotheses and implications in the light of immediate observations.

The subject matter of ethics is the good, and all ethical concepts are defined in terms of it. Ethics is defined as "the class of all propositions of the form A is good." The analysis of possible ethical systems is purely abstract and logical and does not refer to actual existent situations. Goodness is defined under the three ethical doctrines of ethical nihilism, absolutism, and relativism, and each of these submitted to criticism. The result of this criticism is the conclusion that the standard of the good life is most adequately formulated by the theory of hedonism. Happiness becomes the ideal object of law, instead of being governed by the lawyers' aesthetic sense, which is too largely the case today. The author seeks to chart a middle course between the two evils of evaluating law in terms of our own immediate legal ends, and the other equally foolish complacency that accepts whatever has been as right. "The life of legal philosophy is the search for the ethical constant in the ideal of 'natural law with changing content.'"

There are very few criticisms which can be made of this book, since the author has forestalled all criticism by frankly admitting the shortcomings of such a limited study of a very complex subject. He justifies his position in presenting certain destructive

conclusions, and meets the criticism that he has multiplied the formal problems, on the ground that this is in itself a service, since many errors of juristic criticism are due to an oversimplification of the problem. Finally, he takes refuge in the fact of our ignorance and uncertainty by quoting from the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo: "Uncertainty is the lot of every branch of thought and knowledge when verging on the ultimate."

In *Condorcet and the Rise of Liberalism in France* we have a history of the social and economic transformation of France during the eighteenth century which led to the liberalism of the nineteenth and dominated the western nations, together with a biographical account of the part Condorcet played in the revolutionary movement.

The origin of liberalism and laissez-faire in economics is traced to the rise of the bourgeoisie. In religion it meant freedom of conscience and popular education, and rationalism versus revealed religion. It had as its background a moribund state under Louis XV and Louis XVI and a moribund church with its rival sects, the Jansenists and Jesuits.

The political philosophy of the spokesmen of the age of reason was based upon "natural rights," such as liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression, regarded as self-evident principles. No other philosopher more completely exemplified the intellectual movement in France prior to the Revolution than did Condorcet. His early education was of the traditional type. He "was brought

up in the environment of priests, soldiers, and nobles," with the result that he became "a skeptic in religion, a pacifist, and a democrat."

His fortunes are traced from the age of twenty-two, when he wrote on integral calculus through his gradual transformation from a constitutional monarchist to an advocate of a democratic republic. His chief revolutionary contribution was a *Report of the Committee on Education*, which has only recently borne fruit in the latest educational reform in France. His unfortunate literary style hampered his popularity as a writer, at a time when the popular taste was better adapted to the wit of Voltaire, the eloquence of Rousseau, and the elegant suavity of Montesquieu. In the words of Robespierre, "He is a great mathematician in the opinion of the literary men, and a great literary man in the opinion of the mathematicians."

The author has succeeded in presenting an adequate and altogether appealing portrait of a truly great philosopher, whose temporary failure was due to the fact that he would not or did not know how to compromise with a conviction that what the people needed was enlightenment and who would not descend to the level of a political pamphleteer. The final chapter of the book is an evaluation of liberalism which took the form in England and America of "individualism" founded upon the principle of "equal rights to all and special privileges to none." Liberalism, however, because of the concentration of wealth and mass production, is no longer synonymous

with *laissez-faire*. A final suggestion that we must revise political machinery based upon occupational representation and on concentration of power in the hands of the executive, has not been worked out satisfactorily in this volume.

H. L. S.

The administration of President Lowell, represented in a volume of his writings entitled *At War with Academic Tradition in America*, saw even more rapid and revolutionary changes in the growth of Harvard than did that of the late President Eliot. Under Eliot, Harvard turned from a college into a university, and, in the free elective system instituted by him, tried to extend, perhaps not altogether wisely, the spirit and the free choice of graduate to undergraduate study. Under President Lowell, the evolution of Harvard was no less rapid and extraordinary. The College, which had fallen somewhat under the shadow of the University, came once more to the fore. The almost unrestricted undergraduate curriculum *à la carte* was superseded by a choice of *tables d'hôte* with a view to ensuring the student a balanced mental diet. The accent of instruction was shifted from lectures and class-work to private research on the part of the student, with the aid and under the supervision of a tutor, thus putting into practice President Lowell's theory that all efficient education is self-education. Various inducements and devices were introduced to stimulate undergraduate interest in scholarship. Reading periods before examinations, in which no lectures were given, were instituted. The importance of cul-

tural and liberal rather than of too specialized and technical studies were emphasized. The division of the College into Houses modeled somewhat after the Oxford colleges came into being. The immense cultural value of beautiful surroundings and of distinction of living was recognized and incorporated in the architecture, exterior and interior, the placing and the landscaping, of the new University buildings and in the new amenities of student social life.

All this development of the College implied, however, no neglect of the interests or retardation of the growth of the University as a whole. The Graduate Schools also grew in numbers and in efficiency, so that Harvard remained an institution almost equally pre-eminent in all its branches and aspects.

Meantime the President jealously guarded the great traditions of Harvard, and in particular the tradition of liberty—complete liberty of thought, belief, teaching, speaking and writing—for all alike, and of liberty of private habits and the conduct of the private life, except when a private life became a public scandal and brought undesirable publicity to the University.

The whole history of Harvard under President Lowell is reflected in the present volume, which gives us his views upon not only the special problems with which he was confronted but upon almost all the questions and difficulties with which any one charged with the guidance of a great institution of learning is necessarily faced. It is difficult to say which of the many addresses and excerpts is the more important and

the more interesting. We may note, however, his steady insistence that quality, not quantity, whether of schools, departments, or students, makes a university truly great—a deserved rebuke to the tendency of so many American universities to boast of the *number* of students they enroll, of subjects that they teach, of courses that they give, and of degrees that they bestow. Also, his defence of a cultural education as the backbone of any so-called College of Liberal Arts is a timely protest against the increasing invasion of the undergraduate curriculum by technical and vocational subjects and courses, often of a fantastic character.

However, the most burning academic question today for faculty and student body alike is that of freedom of teaching and of discussion. On this point President Lowell expresses himself unequivocally and with admirable clearness and vigour. Within the classroom, he insists, the teacher must be absolutely free to express his opinions, whatever they may be. Outside the class-room he must enjoy similar freedom in publishing his views to the world at large, and in expressing his opinions as a private citizen, provided only he does not pose as an authority on subjects outside his chosen sphere, and does not confuse his official with his private capacity and give the impression that the University as a whole shares his views.

But even if the professor gets out of bounds and exposes his university to risk of injury, "the objection to restraint upon what professors may say as citizens" seems to President Lowell "far

greater than the harm done by leaving them free." Such restraint is not only irritating; it also degrades the professor to a mere employee of the board of trustees and reduces him to a position where he is no longer a free citizen. It must then "tend seriously to discourage the best men from taking up the scholar's life," not to speak of depriving institutions exercising such restraint of their services.

Moreover, "if a university or college censors what its professors," and we might add its undergraduates "may say, if it restrains them from uttering something that it does not approve, it thereby assumes responsibility for that which it permits them to say. . . . If a University is right in restraining its professors, it has a duty to do so, and it is responsible for whatever it permits. There is no middle ground. Either the university assumes full responsibility for permitting its professors to express certain opinions in public, or it assumes no responsibility whatever, and leaves them to be dealt with like other citizens by the public authorities according to the laws of the land."

These are words which perhaps will have no effect upon the rising tide of intolerance and censorship and suppression that is so rapidly inundating the world today. That, unfortunately, they are words that might well be pondered by many institutions in this country is only too clearly shown in the growing role of professors in this country persecuted and even dismissed from their posts for voicing opinions contrary to those held by the presidents or boards of trustees of the institu-

tions with which they are associated. Whether President Lowell's remarks will be so pondered is another question.

All in all, this book in its entirety, voicing as it does the experience and the wisdom of one of the ablest and the wisest of the administrators of the greatest American university, deserves to be read and taken to heart by all who are interested in the problems of liberal education and in conserving the free, critical, and humane point of view which should be its fruit.

B. A. G. Fuller.

The Philosophy of Religion

THE MIND OF PAUL. By *Irwin Edman*. Henry Holt and Company, New York. Pp. 187. 1935.

THE FINAL FAILURE OF CHRISTIANITY. By *Lawrence W. Neff*. Banner Press, Emory University, Atlanta. 1935. Pp. 76. \$1.00.

LA PENSEE RELIGIEUSE FRANCAISE DE CHARRON A PASCAL. Par *Henri Bussom*, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres d'Alger. Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, 6 Place del la Sorbonne, Paris.

THE FARTHER SHORE. An anthology of World Opinion on the Immortality of the Soul, with a Preface to each Selection by the Editors, *athaniel Edward Griffin* and *Laurence Hunt*, and a Foreword by *Alfred North Whitehead*. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. 1934. Pp. xvi, 285. \$3.00.

A STUDENT'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. By *William Kelley Wright*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Revised edition. 1935. Pp. xi, 566. \$3.00.

Many attempts have been made to explain the religious experience of Paul. Whether based on physiological, psychological, biographical, or supernatural grounds, such attempted expla-

nations have been speculative at best. Professor Edman's contribution to the voluminous Pauline literature, *The Mind of Paul*, consists chiefly in the insistence that the religious experience of Paul, however it be explained, itself explains the personality, the career, the thought, and the feeling of the apostle.

The conversion of Paul has been described in simple terms by Paul himself: he had seen Christ the Lord and had at the same time been called to be an apostle. After that experience, sudden in its occurrence but permanent in its effects, Paul could say: "It is not I that live but Christ that liveth in me." The clue to an understanding of Paul is therefore to be sought not in his theological method or "system," not in his missionary activities or ascetic and "fanatical" tendencies, not even in Romans seven (which is a homiletical exposition in rhetorical vein rather than a spiritual autobiography), but in his vision and in his mysticism. Paul the Jew, Paul the follower of Jesus, and Paul the Greek are to be construed in terms of Paul the mystic.

Many features of his Jewish background were retained by Paul: his conception of the law, of sin, the flesh, and death, of God, the Messiah, and the kingdom of God; his technique, materials, and allegories; his feeling of kinship with his people and his devotion to the customs and the institutional forms of Judaism. But unlike Jesus and the early disciples, Paul was able to see around Judaism and to transform a particularist into a universal (one is tempted to say

"imperialistic") conception of religion. The Jesus of history and of the apostolic tradition were not without influence upon Paul; but he placed the historical Jesus in a cosmological setting and an eschatological perspective, and emphasized the resurrection rather than the crucifixion, and the mystic vision of the Christ of the Hellenizing Christians whom he had persecuted rather than the Jesus who had come and would come again for the people of Israel. The distinctiveness of Paul's contribution to religion was in large part a product of his break with the Judaizing Christians.

It was inevitable that the message of Paul should come to appeal more to the Gentiles than to the Jews. For Paul had made of Christianity a mystery religion, and to the Gentiles the identification of sin and flesh, the dualism of flesh and spirit, and the proposed method of deliverance from the flesh were not unfamiliar conceptions. Yet in the hands of Paul the mystery religions became transfigured; there was the definite hope of immortality; there was the touching appeal of the central figure; there was, above all, the moral transformation wrought by assimilation to the character of the Lord and by the bringing forth of the "fruits of the spirit." Taken as a whole, Paul's mysticism is described by Professor Edman as lying "somewhere between the philosophical union of the Neo-Platonists and the magical association of the mystery religions." For "the being of Christ lived functionally in the life of the believer." In addition, those who lived in the spirit of Christ formed a mystic brotherhood, so that Paul's doc-

trine of the church, like most of his other doctrines, are best appreciated in their vital connection with his mysticism. Nor was the mysticism of Paul merely rapturous: it included a spiritual knowledge which in its perfection was one with love realized. In short, what is most characteristic of and impressive about Paul is not this or that detail, but the mysticism pervading his principal ideas and sentiments.

Professor Edman's treatment of Paul is studded with literary gems, of which the following is illustrative: "Paul's Christology is his sense of Christ's being. It is not a science and a theory, it is an absorption and an awareness." Interested readers will be grateful to Professor Edman for his interpretation of Paul as

a personality controlled by a vision he had once had—however one explains his having had it—and possessed by that vision for the remainder of his life.

Richard Hope.

Lawrence W. Neff is properly anxious to clear himself of all suspicion of fundamentalism and admirably succeeds. His volume *The Final Failure of Christianity*, though quite untrue to its title, indicates that it is written out of the atmosphere of controversy. It speaks volumes for the author's intellectual and theological surroundings that he feels it necessary to maintain a certain vehemence of expression.

He is too often positive on points that are not admitted by genuine and critical scholarship in order to make out an extreme and easy victory. This method defeats itself.

His criticisms of Paul, in an effort to exaggerate the Paul *versus* Christ controversy, would seem largely dependent on the fact that Paul was not Christ. He quite overlooks the value of Paul's Greek training in bringing the gospel to the Greek world, which made Christianity something more than another Jewish sect. He is quite blind to the cosmic meaning of the Cross, which is an unwelcome thought to all lovers of ease and spiritual complacency. To cap the climax, Paul, the man "in perils oft," who was mobbed and hounded from city to city, only to reach the Mamertine Prison and death in the end, is called the "encourager of soft indulgence."

One could hope for a convincing refutation of fundamentalism but surely must find it in some less opinionated and more scholarly place than this. Yet the author has an incurable faith in Christianity as he interprets it.

Bussom's work on *French Religious Thought from Charron to Pascal* is the second volume of a larger work on the history of modern rationalism. Though not by any means alone in this field, he aims to supplement and complete the work of other writers.

With a sure judgment he has refused to confine himself to the theological writings of this period, and even to the philosophical controversies of the age. Outside these sources he seeks the popular expression of theology as it appears in the literary production of the time.

It was a revolutionary epoch in the history of thought whose influences were very great in the following period and are strong

even at the present. The work is of great value in tracing the sources and development of ideas and in the bibliography of important works which it provides the serious student.

Like practically all other histories of European thought it ignores the influence of the Chinese impact, which deserves mention along with the revival of classicism in Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Pyrrhonism. The movement of French—and European—thought cannot be understood apart from the Chinese influence. Just as one could not properly essay the history of French painting or its architecture apart from the *rococo*, or even of the rising political theories (land taxes, paper money, *laissez-faire* political economy) without reckoning with China, so, much credit must be given the new knowledge of Chinese religion and philosophy for the movements of Deism, Naturalism, Skepticism and Higher Criticism in religion. However, this is a virgin chapter in the history of thought which remains to be written.

The quotations in this volume concerning *The Farther Shore* are classics, and the introductions by the Editors provide a great part of the interest in the volume. Can the subject of immortality ever form for the present age anything but a gruesome picture? This is the question that rises within one as he peruses these pages.

The reviewer cannot escape the conviction that however classic the selections the mood and faith of the Editors are the most important elements in the book. The reader gathers that these present

a disbelief in immortality. From beginning to end there is little else than a consideration of the darker aspects of death and almost nothing of an abounding hope for eternal life. The book is for the most part a consideration of death rather than of immortality. Had it been otherwise there had been a different choice of selections.

Significant of this fact is it that the translations from Plato are from the *Apologia* and the *Phaedo* rather than from the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*. From St. Paul we have the didactic and somewhat uninspiring fifteenth chapter of *I. Corinthians* concerning the various glories of the sun, moon and stars, but no touch of that abounding faith in the reality of the invisible which ran throughout the Pauline letters, "for the things that are seen are temporal but the things that are unseen are eternal." From the Gospels we have the story of the Women at the Tomb and the Parable of Dives and Lazarus but no inkling of the last talk with the Disciples, "Because I live ye shall live also." It is this failure at spiritual perception, want of insight as to the real meaning of immortality, which seems to us to furnish the fatal flaw in this effort to furnish a picture of world opinion on the immortality of the soul. Illustration of this is the inexcusable repetition of the sermon of Jonathan Edwards on *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God*. One would be willing to wager that no reader of this work will have, prior to its appearance here, read this sermon, it has been such a long time dead.

If we were to be furnished with the world's despair at the pros-

pect of death we might at least have been provided with the disbeliever's offset of hope as expressed in the beautiful phraseology of Epicurus:

"This reasoning, moreover, causeth that we shall not be frustrated of Pleasure even then, when Death shall take us by the hand, and shew us the period of all these Mortal things, insomuch as we shall thereby attain the perfect, and so delectable, End of a very Good Life, rising from the table of the World as Guests well satisfied with the Good Entertainments of Life, and having duly performed all those Duties, which to perform, we received life." (From First English translation by W. Charleton, London, 1685.)

R. T. F.

Several generations of teachers and students who have used Wright's *A Student's Philosophy of Religion* will be pleased to know that its usefulness is to be continued in the form of a new revision. In the new edition three chapters have been added: A conclusion in defence of the author's views in the light of criticisms and recent developments in the field, one chapter on the development of religion in China, and one on Mohammedanism.

In the previous volume this definition was given: "Religion is the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through specific actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence upon this agency."

Three criticisms of this definition have been suggested: That

it does not make room for the aesthetic element in religion; that it does not adequately recognize the function of religion as an agency in social reform; and that it does not make a place for Humanism and Russian Communism as types of religion. In answer, it is held that the aesthetic and the religious sentiment are not the same, while their close relationship is recognized. Humanism and Russian Communism are disposed of by being classified as quasi-religious only. The problem of the attitude of religion with respect to problems of social reform is ably met by the contention that matters of social reform demand expert knowledge and opinion, and since the church is in no position to pioneer in these fields, the best it can do is to await this expert knowledge and to act progressively and constructively in the light of it.

The present depression in religion is admitted and traced to a moral and economic lapse accompanied by intellectual doubt. No spectacular future is predicted for religion but it is believed by the author that Theism will become more widespread in the opinion of both scholars and the general public, and that this will result in a decreased emphasis upon matters where there is little consensus of opinion, and consequently will result in fewer denominations.

H. L. S.

Beauty in Man and Mathematics

THE POETRY OF MATHEMATICS AND OTHER ESSAYS. By *David Eugene Smith*. Scripta Mathematica, Yeshiva College, New York. 1934. Pp. xxiv, 90. Paper cover, 90 cents; cloth cover, 75 cents.

BEAUTY AND HUMAN NATURE. Elements of Psychological Aesthetics. By *Albert R. Chandler*. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York. 1935. Pp. 360. \$3.50.

Albert R. Chandler's *Beauty and Human Nature* is a survey of psychological experimentation in aesthetics carried out during the past seventy years in the fields of visual forms, colour, music and literature. It is assumed that in seeking explanations of aesthetic fact through experimentation we are getting into closer contact with that fact and thereby knowing it the more perfectly. But may it not be that, like the Ghost in *Hamlet*, "we do it wrong being so majestic, to offer it the show of violence," for when we try to analyze aesthetic fact and bring it under laboratory conditions, bring it, as it were, into the dissecting room, the immediacy and integrity of the fact itself slips away, and what we are left to study is but a portion of the lifeless body. But be this as it may, the author of this book has based his discussion on experimental data, and we must regard, the work from that standpoint and as such it is excellently carried out.

The book includes chapters on Architecture, Sculpture, Pictorial Art, Music, Language, and Literature. Although Dr. Chandler, who is Professor of Philosophy at Ohio State University, proposes to find the key to Beauty through experimental studies, yet he knows himself where the true source of aesthetic experience lies:

Pure art is art, whose primary aim lies in the satisfaction of the observer. A symphony can neither expound nor exhort. Its

aim is the exalted mood produced in the spectator while he listens. Paintings need not be decorative; they need not be intended for a specific position in a specific room; they may be meant to absorb our attention without reference to their surroundings. Literary works need not be either didactic or hortatory; they may introduce us into an imaginary world which is worth while in itself.

To take but one of the subjects that the book deals with, color; an attempt is made to find out an order of the pleasantness and unpleasantness and general expressiveness of colors. The result of the experiments that have been carried out tends to show that such effects seem to depend on a multitude of factors that vary with individual observers and changing circumstances. Such a modicum of uniformity as can be established seems not to be determined by the hue or saturation of colors but to rest on some persistent contexts. Blue, for example, may give the idea of serenity, green of youth, hope, joy, because the one is associated with the sky, the other with the tender colour of the spring-time. With regard to colour, a symbolic and emblematic language has grown up and such uses of colour consistently and unconsciously influence their emotional value. We have but to remember that certain colours have come to have canonical significance in the Catholic Church to realize how colours acquire emotional effects. It is amusing to speculate on the results traffic signals may have in regard to the expressiveness of the colours red, green and yellow!

To all interested in the experimental side of aesthetics we rec-

ommend this book, both for the wideness of the field it covers and for its clearness of exposition.

Geraldine Wildon Carr.

David Eugene Smith, Professor Emeritus of Mathematics at Columbia University, is a poet as well as a mathematician, hence this little volume of addresses and its title *The Poetry of Mathematics*.

Professor Smith is right in assigning mathematics to the realm of the imagination. He is correct also in the assumption of reality for the rational creations of the imagination whether in science or religion. In one essay he brings to light little-known facts regarding the intellectual interests of Thomas Jefferson, and in another the interesting career of the French mathematician Gaspard Monge. It fell to the lot of the reviewer to be stationed with the Army Educational Corps at Beaune, the birthplace of Monge, and to know of him in only a general way. The possession of the information here given would at that time have added much to interesting associations.

If Professor Smith has overdrawn certain analogies, as in his confusing the infinitude of existence, of God, and of immortality with the presumed divisibility of the straight line, it may be excused as the outlook of a mathematical poet.

R. T. F.

Historical Studies

ARISTOTLE: Natural Science, Psychology, and Nichomachean Ethics. Edited by *Philip Wheelwright*. Doubleday, Doran and Company, Garden City. 1935. Pp. xlii, 244. \$1.25.

BERKELEY-HUME. Edited by *Philip Wheelwright*. Doubleday, Doran and Company, Garden City. 1935. Pp. xxxiv, 380. \$1.25.

JEREMY BENTHAM, JAMES MILL, JOHN STUART MILL. Edited by Philip Wheelwright. Doubleday, Doran and Company, Garden City. 1935. Pp. xxvi, 477. \$1.25.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ROME. By William Chase Greene. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1933. Pp. xiv, 560. \$4.50.

These volumes of selections, edited, and in the case of Aristotle, translated, by Professor Wheelwright of New York University, are well chosen in content and well suited for classroom use, when for one reason or another more extensive reading in the authors is not possible. At the same time, in view of the excellent volumes of selections already published by Scribners, we cannot help feeling that the new series so far as it parallels these selections is somewhat of a work of supererogation and will have difficulty in superseding them.

This criticism naturally does not apply where the series strikes out into new ground, as it has done in the excerpts from Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill. These are carefully chosen, and form an admirable resumé of some of the basic documents of the utilitarian movement, of great value both to the student and to anyone who is interested in philosophy, and, we may add in this case, in economic and political theory.

In this very pleasant and interesting study of *The Achievement of Rome* Professor Greene has managed with great skill to impart a large amount of information about Roman life in all its phases, and at the same time wholly to avoid the didactic and encyclopaedic atmosphere with which general surveys of epochs of civilization are only too apt to

be clouded and dulled. Chapter by chapter we seem to loiter agreeably, though in reality we are travelling quite briskly, through pre-Roman Italy and the history of Rome, Roman social and political institutions, and the art, the literature, the philosophical and the religious movements that Roman civilization produced. All these aspects are treated with an admirable sense of just proportion and interrelation, and fall together into a single perspective unmarred by over-emphasis upon a single phase, as is sometimes the case in books of this sort. Professor Greene, moreover, knows whereof he speaks, though his erudition is so humane and his way of writing so human that we almost forget we are consorting with an "authority" in the field in which he has invited us to dally. All in all, anyone interested in Rome and everything it stood for, be he professed scholar or just a layman, could not find a sounder, a more instructive, and at the same time more sympathetic and delightful guide than Professor Greene's book.

B. A. G. F.

Science and Magic

RACE, SEX AND ENVIRONMENT. A Study of Mineral Deficiency in Human Evolution. By J. R. de la H. Marett. Hutchinson's Scientific and Technical Publications, London. 1936. Pp. 342. 21 Sh.

A HISTORY OF MAGIC AND EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE. Vols. III and IV. Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. By Lynn Thorndike. Columbia University Press, New York. 1935. Vol. III, pp. xxvi, 827. Vol. IV, pp. xviii, 767. \$10.00. 2 vols.

The author of this erudite, and very interesting and suggestive book on *Race, Sex and Environment* is a son of Dr. R. R. Marett,

the well-known anthropologist of Oxford, and his work may be described as the first large-scale attempt to apply the doctrines of modern bio-chemistry and endocrinology to anthropology and the multifarious problems of human evolution. Of course the evidence out of which Mr. Marett builds his hypotheses is as yet very fragmentary and scattered, and his inferences are everywhere liable to correction as further data accumulate; but Mr. Marett, who is by no means a mere theorizer and who has had considerable experience as a breeder of Jersey cattle, is well aware of this and is always ready to explore the alternatives to what he considers the most probable view. And withal his discussions are always concise and clear, and put his reader in a position to form his own judgment on the available facts. So I am disposed to regard his work not only as original and suggestive but also as a valuable model of scientific method in a difficult and confusing field. How far Mr. Marett's hypotheses and conclusions will stand the test of further inquiry it would be rash to predict; but they are of the sort that is eminently fitted to guide investigation and to allow itself to be verified or corrected. And that is perhaps the greatest service that can be rendered science. Meanwhile it seems appropriate to draw attention to several points in which Mr. Marett's theories, while not very flattering to human vanity, seem distinctly superior to other speculations about human pre-history. In the first place, he recognizes an enormous amount of degeneration: "if Man is a foetalized ape produced by severe iodine deficiency, it is

probable that the first man was white" (p. 218). Probably, therefore, "the white skin was retained as a palaeanthropic character, and pigmentation was re-evolved by the first emigrants who made their habitat in the south" (*ibid.*). Secondly, he holds that not only all existing races but also all known species of prehistoric man were probably mixed. Lastly, he does not shrink from plainly drawing a consequence implicit in the Mendelian theory, viz., that under favorable circumstances two very different races may spring from the same cross, and that *both* may be superior to their ancestors (p. 254).

The only criticism I feel called upon to suggest is that Mr. Marett does not (pp. 178, 179) make it sufficiently plausible that the coarse-boned ancestors of the Neanderthaloids and Sinanthropus, having been caught in Central Asia while the H i m a l a y a s were rising, were adapted to life on the mountains and cold tundra and to *vegetable* food, while the ancestors of Modern Man were denizens of the tropical forest and *carnivores*. Surely the mountains and the tundras were not rich in vegetable food man finds it easy to assimilate, especially in winter; while the tropical forests perennially abound in fruits and shoots. Possibly Mr. Marett has been beguiled by the somewhat anomalous case of the Kivu gorillas to overlook the superior merits of Carveth Read's charming "wolf-ape" theory (of which indeed he does not seem to be aware), which argues that it was precisely a deterioration in a tropical climate which forced our ancestors to give up vegetarianism and to pursue big game in

bands of carnivorous hunters. But this is a very slight oversight in an excellent book, which its author has not disdained to equip also with a useful glossary.

F. C. S. S.

It is significant of the three great names of the Fourteenth Century, Duns Scotus, Agostino Triumfo, and Thaddeus of Parma, that Professor Thorndike should give first and most extended notice to Duns Scotus, proponent of Natural Law and freedom of the will. To the disciple of mechanism the connection will not seem so apparent, but those epochs in which these two ideas work together are sure to be the ones marked by the greatest scientific and cultural advance. The present scientific admission of contingency is a foregleam of new achievement both in the realm of science and in that of Humanism. Great as was Thomas Aquinas, it was Duns Scotus who held in the midst of his ideas the elements that were to vitalize and dominate the following centuries.

One is amazed at the vastness of the field covered by these volumes and the hardihood of the author in the translation of what seems an endless succession of documents out of the Medieval Latin in which they were written. Since his purpose was a history of magic and experimental science he can scarcely be criticized for not making it something other than it is. On the other hand, these volumes would have been vastly more valuable both to science and to history if they had concerned themselves more with the philosophical ideas which were the real sources of the ris-

ing scientific spirit and less with the useless repetition of magical formulae. These latter were almost never original but were arrived at by the collection of uncriticized superstitions from all sources. Too many of the sixteen hundred pages are the repetition of the same magic charms. Thus it has come about in our judgment that years of toil have been spent in bringing to light the least important work of these centuries and that which really had least to do with the beginnings and growth of scientific insight. The important element in the advance of scientific discovery was the transition from the Platonic concept of knowledge by deduction, the knowledge of authority and revelation, to the Aristotelian concept of induction and organism. Here lay the springs of the new science, but of this the author gives us little inkling.

However, it is not our wish to discredit an herculean task that has done so much to bring to light the forgotten names and works of men who were the real founders of present culture. These volumes, encyclopedic in nature, will be much resorted to by students and will help the cause of scholarship by disclosing in the English language the little-known materials of Medieval and Renaissance scholarship. In our judgment the bibliographical information of these volumes quite justifies the great cost of publication and lays scholarship under a real debt to the Columbia University Press, and warms our admiration for the scholarship of Professor Thorndike. They will of necessity find place in every library of importance.

R. T. F.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Books not commented on here reserved for more extensive review.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY. Pamphlet by *Torgny T. Segerstedt*, of the University of Lund. C. W. K. Gleerup, Lund. 1935. Pp. 158.

An historical and critical study of the epistemological doctrines of Reid, Stewart, Hamilton and Ferrier.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY AND TOMORROW. A Symposium. Edited by *Horace M. Kallen* and *Sidney Hook*. Lee Furman, Inc., New York. 1935. Pp. 518. \$3.75. Reviewed in this number.

RETURN TO PHILOSOPHY. By *C. E. M. Joad*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1936. Pp. 279. \$2.50.

WORLDS WITHOUT END. By *H. Spencer Jones*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1935. Pp. ix, 329. \$3.00.

COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: Volume VI. Edited by *Charles Hartshorne* and *Paul Weiss*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1935. Pp. 462. \$5.00. Reviewed in this number.

TIME'S ARROW IN SOCIETY. By *Anderson Woods*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1935. Pp. 233. \$2.00.

THE PROBLEM OF TIME. University of California Publications in Philosophy, Volume 18. Edited by *George P. Adams*, *J. Loewenberg*, and *Stephen C. Pepper*. University of California Press, Berkeley, and Cambridge University Press, London. 1935. Pp. 266. \$2.25.

JEREMY BENTHAM, JAMES MILL, JOHN STUART MILL. Selected Writings. Edited by *Philip Wheelwright*. Doubleday, Doran and Company, Garden City. 1935. Pp. xxvi, 477. \$1.25.

GOD IS NOT THE NAME. By Edward Remington Ames, author and publisher, Los Angeles. 1935. Pp. 64.

DOCTOR OF THE NORTH COUNTRY. By *Earl Vinton McComb*, M.D., with a preface by *Logan Clendenning*, M.D. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1935. Pp. 238. \$2.00.

HOLY FLAME. Religious Verse. By *Georgia Harkness*. Bruce Humphries, Boston. 1935. Pp. 96. \$1.50.

WILLIAM TORREY HARRIS, 1835-1935. In Commemoration. Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. 1936. \$1.25.

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS FOR ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD. By Nine Former Students. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. 1936. Pp. 248. \$3.00.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN PERSONALITY. By *Ernest M. Ligon*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1935. Pp. x, 393. \$3.00.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE CONCEPTS OF MODERN SCIENCE. By *Oliver L. Reiser*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1935. Pp. xvii, 323. \$3.50.

- INTERPRETATIONS: 1933-1935. By *Walter Lippmann*. Edited by *Allan Nevins*. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1935. Pp. x, 399. \$2.50.
- HEREDITY AND THE ASCENT OF MAN. By *C. C. Hurst*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1935. Pp. ix, 138. \$1.50.
- UNSOLVED PROBLEMS. By *A. W. Haslett*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1935. Pp. xi, 317. \$2.00.
- CHRONOLOGY OF BOOKS AND PRINTING. By *David Greenhood and Helen Gentry*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1936. Pp. viii, 186. \$2.00.
- TRAIT-NAMES. A Psycho-lexical Study. By *Gordon W. Allport and Henry S. Odbert*. Published for the American Psychological Association by the Psychological Review Company, Princeton, N.J.
- MENCIUS. Translated by *Leonard A. Lyall*. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. 1932. Pp. xxviii, 277. \$5.00.
- THE FATE OF MAN IN THE MODERN WORLD. By *Nicholas Berdyaev*. Morehouse Publishing Company, Milwaukee. 1935. Pp. 120. \$1.25.
- HUME'S THEORY OF THE UNDERSTANDING. By *Ralph W. Church*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 1935. Pp. 238. \$3.00.
- RELIGION AND SCIENCE. By *Bertrand Russell*. Henry Holt and Company, New York. 1935. Pp. 265. \$2.00.
- BEHAVIOR, KNOWLEDGE, FACT. By *Arthur F. Bentley*. The Principia Press, Bloomington, Indiana. 1935. Pp. xii, 387. \$3.50.
- ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHIES OF A PLANNED SOCIETY. By *Richard Hope*. A Pamphlet, reprinted from the Columbia University Quarterly, December 1935, Vol. XXVII, No. 4. Pp. 18.
- THE IMMUTABLE LAW. By *James Revere Burke*. With Introductory Notes by *Edward S. Martin* and *Frederick Bligh Bond*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1936. Pp. xii, 115. \$1.00.
- ENGLISH DEISM: ITS ROOTS AND ITS FRUITS. By *John Orr*. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids. 1934. Pp. 283. \$2.50.
- RELIGION AND THE CHURCH TOMORROW. Edited by *Fred B. Wyand*. Cokesbury Press, Nashville. 1936. Pp. 222. \$2.00.
- MODERN MAN'S WORSHIP. By *Bernard Eugene Meland*. Harper and Brothers, New York. 1934. Pp. xix, 317. \$2.50.
- JESUS AS TEACHER. By *Henry B. Sharman*. Harper and Brothers, New York. 1935. Pp. 168. \$2.00.

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	<i>Two Great Books on China</i> My Country and My People: <i>Yutang</i> . The Great Wall Crumbles: <i>Clark</i> .	
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OUR CONTRIBUTORS' PAGE

"The real question is not: *Have* we souls? but *Are* we souls?" This is the answer which **The Editor** gives to a question recently put to him, and now embodied in the title of his article *Have We Souls?*

That personalism and impersonalism represent two fundamentally different points of view and methodologies is the position presented by **Professor William Stern**, the German Personalist, in his article on *The Metaphysical Foundations of Critical Personalism*. This is the first of a series under the general heading of *Critical Personalism*. Dr. Stern, who is Professor of Psychology at the University of Hamburg, is at present Visiting Professor at Duke University, and will be lecturing this summer at Harvard.

Hypocritesbane Voltaire is the true name for the great French satirist, according to **Dr. William van Wyck**, who writes of him under that title in the first of a series of sketches of creative figures in literature. Evidently Dr. van Wyck is himself no lover of hypocrisy, for he writes in a spirit and with a wit appropriate to his subject. Dr. van Wyck, whose poetry and prose has appeared in former issues, is now residing in San Francisco.

Depths of Reality, rather than levels, is what **Professor Jared S. Moore** finds as the main characteristic of experience. Experiences are not primarily higher and lower, nor merely emergent, he explains. Rather, certain experiences are merely surface appearances of others which include both the surface and the otherwise hidden depths. Dr. Moore is Professor of Philosophy at Western Reserve University, Ohio.

Christian mysticism consists essentially in a living, personal experience, whereas Buddhist mysticism tends to be quiescent and impersonal, according to **Professor N. Lossky** of the University of Prague, in his critical discussion of *Christian Versus Buddhist Mysticism*. Professor Lossky's former contributions to *The Personalist* will be remembered.

In this number **The Editor's** series, *Reflections of a Peripatetic*, is brought to a close with a description of "Peking Night" and a discussion of the Eighteenth Century European enthusiasm for things Chinese.

In her poem, *A Thing of Moods*, **Frances Wesley** presents a musical rendering of the sea. **Marion Elmo** contributes a poem expressing the *Heresy of a Novice*.